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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Patents are an important reward and motivation for innovative pharmaceutical companies. 
Despite being only one of the many incentives provided for pharmaceutical companies,1 they 
have maintained their position as valuable and cherished assets. The companies regularly use 
the right to exclude conferred by a patent to maintain an exclusive market for their products. 
Injunctions are sought for infringements that cannot be settled. The grant of an injunction after 
an established patent infringement remains quite automatic in the EU. Also in the US the grant 
of injunctions for pharmaceutical patents is the main rule even after the eBay judgment2 changed 
the game for many other patents.  
Recently human rights considerations have increased both generally and within intellectual 
property law. The realization of health rights has gained more attention also in developed 
countries, where pharmaceuticals are generally well available but not always accessible for 
everyone. Sometimes the use of injunctions can make a pharmaceutical unavailable or 
inaccessible to a part of the patient population. In these cases, it is relevant to ask whether the 
patent owner’s right to exclude always prevails over public interest and the patients’ right to 
health. From this setting arises the question whether health rights should be taken into account 
in the enforcement of pharmaceutical patents and how this could be done. 
There are several ways in which the use of patents can be limited. The most popular in the EU 
has been competition law, which has been used to sanction practices contrary to the competition 
values of the EU. Another measure to control the behavior of pharmaceutical companies would 
be controlling the availability of injunctions. An injunction might be denied if it would 
compromise health rights to an unacceptable degree.  
The discussion about whether injunctions should be discretionary or automatic3 is very topical 
in patent law, and current trends seem to emphasize the need for balancing different interests. 
                                                          
1 The others include regulatory data and market exclusivities and pricing and reimbursement mechanisms.  
2 547 U.S. 388 eBay v. MercExchange (2006). 
3 Automatic injunctions mean that they are granted in all cases when a valid right has been infringed without the 
need for the patentee to argue why injunction is needed or necessary. In such a system, the court will not discuss 
or balance any competing interests, but the injunction is issued as a matter of course. 
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Pharmaceutical patents have always been subject to criticism and their effects on the realization 
of human rights and social justice have been widely discussed. Still, discretion in the grant of 
injunctions in the context of pharmaceutical patents remains a rather new idea. It might be 
argued that there are other mechanisms to take care of the realization of human rights and that 
courts dealing with patent matters should not be exposed to such considerations. Yet, most 
mechanisms only apply within a narrow time frame or a specific administrative phase, so the 
existence of an additional layer of control should not be downright rejected. The following 
analysis will conclude that discretion could indeed be exercised under European patent law 
without any legislative changes. However, there are reasons why the denial of injunctions should 
be limited to special circumstances and interests of the patentee should remain a central concern 
even if balancing with health rights is exercised. 
1.2 Research Question and Limitations 
My main research question in this thesis is as follows:  
Can health rights be used as a discretionary limitation in the grant of permanent 
injunctions for pharmaceutical patents in the EU?  
The question can be broken down into sub-questions, including: Are injunctions always 
available as automatic remedies? Do EU courts have authority not to grant injunctions based on 
public interest? Do EU courts have discretion to take into account health rights in patent trials? 
Are there situations when it might be reasonable to deny a pharmaceutical patent injunctive 
relief? As follow-up questions I will discuss how this kind of discretion could be exercised and 
whether EU courts should use more discretion in granting injunctions for pharmaceutical 
patents. 
As the research question implies, only permanent injunctions will be considered.4 Preliminary 
injunctions are ruled out, so the word injunction will always refer to a permanent injunction 
unless otherwise specified. I also limit the analysis to pharmaceutical patents. The regulatory 
and business environment of medical devices is significantly different from that of 
                                                          
4 The central legal dogmatic questions relating to preliminary injunctions include the prerequisites of grant, 
procedural questions as well as legal effects and suspension of the injunction. Especially the procedural aspects 
stand out in these discussions and they are very different from the issues relating to permanent injunctions. Norrgård 
2002 p. 9. 
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pharmaceuticals,5 so they are left out of the main analysis, although some examples are 
provided. Some statements also apply to medical devices. 
The analysis is limited to developed countries. The main question concerns Europe, but 
perspectives from the USA will be carried along comparatively. In practice this limitation means 
that when discussing the right to health and access to medicine, the main issue is usually not 
about essential medicines not being available. Rather the issue is novel medicines not being 
affordable. The access problems of developing counties would be significantly different from 
those of the EU, and they are only touched upon lightly. USA is discussed thoroughly because 
of the extensive discussion around the topic there, their fundamentally different approach to 
injunctions and the fact that many major pharmaceutical companies are based there.6 
Other means that could strengthen the realization of health rights in relation to patented 
inventions will not be extensively discussed. Minor comments are still made about them, these 
including the use of competition law, compulsory licensing and legislative action. The main 
analysis will only concern discretion in the grant of injunctions. 
The research question connects tightly to the more general debates of the IP field. These include 
the relationship of IP and human rights as well as the relationship of property and liability rules. 
This analysis also contributes to the discussion of how absolute the patentee's right to exclude 
is and whether courts should exercise discretion in awarding injunctions after successful 
infringement suits. The discussions around these themes will be applied to the specific case of 
pharmaceuticals and health rights. 
1.3 Methods and Materials 
The method of this thesis is predominantly legal dogmatic, most of all practical legal dogmatic. 
This means that I will interpret the legal state of patent injunctions and health rights from the 
perspective of current society. The method is argumentative and leans on a variety of legal 
sources. Essentially, it will be an exercise of weighing and balancing the opposite interests 
surrounding the topics at hand.7 Comparative law will also be utilized when discussing the 
                                                          
5 Medical devices typically utilize multiple patents whereas pharmaceuticals usually only use one or a few. Medical 
devices are also not subject to a similar, strict authorization procedure, to name a few differences. Similar health 
rights arguments can be stated in both cases. 
6 Helm 2009 p. 39. 
7 On legal dogmatic methods see Aarnio 1997 p. 35–53. 
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applicability of US reasoning to a European setting, but it is not the main method. Additionally, 
because my research question centrally concerns a tension between two fundamental rights, part 
of the analysis is inevitably going to be influenced by values. Giving priority to one right over 
another or balancing competing interests is not a legal dogmatic exercise but a value-based 
conclusion. This is why I also employ law and politics in addition to the legal dogmatic 
approach. The starting point of the analysis will be current legal practice, so that the conclusions 
would have maximal practical significance.8 
My research question brings together health rights, IP and pharmaceutical business. This 
combination can be seen in the set of references: the materials can be roughly classified into 
categories of human rights sources, intellectual property sources and pharmaceutical industry 
sources.9 The analysis will start by discussion of international agreements and EU primary law 
concerning human rights and intellectual property. These instruments will be assigned 
substantial legal value. Some official documents (especially of the UN sphere) and case law will 
also be used. Apart from those, the majority of references will be European and US literature, 
especially research articles.10  
As already mentioned, the research question implies a value-based assessment and is as such 
also emotionally triggering. Many scholars addressing the patenting practices of the 
pharmaceutical industry are clearly either on the "patent side" or "human rights side" of the 
debate.11 In this thesis, I strive for neutrality and to give both interests the weight that belongs 
to them according to the legal dogmatic analysis. One goal of this thesis is to match the interests 
of patentees and the general public on this specific question in a way that would make taking 
sides unnecessary.12  
                                                          
8 On methods of constitutional law see Jyränki 1997 p. 75–77. 
9 Of course, many references also combine more than one category. 
10 The role of international agreement and EU legislation in the traditional hierarchy of sources of law has been 
much discussed. In this thesis, I assume them as the primary starting point. In practice this means that human rights 
sources are highly esteemed. Secondary legislation, case law and literature are used to bring the perspectives of 
primary law to a sufficient level of detail and practical applicability. For more discussion, see Karhu 2003, Hurri 
2004, Syrjänen 2009. 
11 This might also be an effect of framing, in this case rhetorically presenting the issue at hand to be either purely 
a human rights matter or a business matter. See Matthews 2011 p. 8–9. However, others are clearly opposing any 
kind of patent protection for medical applications. See e.g. Brown 2016. 
12 There will of course remain value-based choices, but what I would like to show is that the issue is not about 




In chapter 2, I will introduce the position of the patentee's right to exclude as a fundamental 
right. As background, basics of property protection of IP will be provided. The chapter is 
concluded by an introduction to the innovative pharmaceutical business and its specific interests 
related to patents and exclusivity. Chapter 3 will introduce the content and legislative 
background of health rights. It will also address the question how these rights relate to IP and 
whether there is an inherent conflict between these bodies of law and how such conflict could 
be resolved. Human rights law based arguments to raise health rights over patent rights will be 
considered. 
Chapter 4 will consider the specific situation of issuing injunctions. It will introduce the 
dilemma of whether injunctions should be automatic or discretionary and describe the current 
European and US practices. Drawing from the US eBay judgment, the possibilities of similar 
developments in the EU will be contemplated considering especially the Enforcement Directive 
and the Unified Patent Court. This chapter will conclude that it would indeed be possible to use 
health rights as a discretionary limitation to pharmaceutical patent enforcement in the EU and 
to bring human rights considerations into patent law. 
Chapter 5 will take the conclusions of chapter 4 and answer more specifically the question how 
and when such discretion could be exercised within the current legal framework. The goal of 
this chapter is to find a just balance between the different interests and to formulate grounds on 
which an injunction might be denied. I will discuss corporate human rights compliance and the 
use of a public interest criterion, taking into account the patentee's possibilities to affect the 
outcome. Finally, the values behind the different options will be discussed. Chapter 6 concludes 
the finding of this study. 
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2.  Right to Exclude and Pharmaceutical Business 
2.1  Patents as Property Rights 
2.1.1 Justification of Intellectual Property and Patents 
The justification of intellectual property (IP; including patents) stems nowadays mostly from 
utilitarian ideas.13 There are many rationales around which the justification of IP can be framed. 
Under natural law, IPRs result from the natural right of a person to the fruits of their work. This 
idea does not entirely suit patent law, but it can be detected in the human rights protection of IP 
as an indistinguishable form of property.14 In addition, patents can be framed as a contract 
between the inventor and the society: limited exclusivity in exchange for disclosure of the 
invention. They can also be seen as rewards for contributing to the development of society or as 
incentives to create and innovate.15 Lastly, patents can be conceptualized as prospects that 
provide the inventor security to develop the invention further, to prepare to enter the market and 
to search funding.16 
The relevance of IP has increased in the recent decades as its scope and forms have expanded. 
The expansion of IP legislation has been criticized a lot and many have called for broader 
exceptions and limitations. Yet, IP already is subject to various limitations, starting from the 
careful definitions of protected subject-matter and limited terms of protection.17 Simply the fact 
that the use of IP triggers criticism does not mean that the IP itself or its use would not be 
justified. The ultimate goal is a balance between the interests of the patentee and the public. 
The traditional view is that limitations to exclusive rights should be interpreted narrowly.18 As 
a result of this thinking, IPRs have often been prioritized over the interests protected by the 
                                                          
13 Hestermeyer 2007 p. 29. 
14 Id. p. 30. The idea has its roots in Locke's philosophy, but contradicts current patent laws that require a 
registration procedure and limit patent rights temporally. It is more applicable to copyright, where the protection 
lasts over the creator's lifetime and also includes moral rights. 
15 Malani & Masur 2013 p. 642–643. 
16 Hestermeyer 2007 p. 30–33. 
17 Oesch 2017 p. 2–3. Criticism of IPRs does not always speak for distortion of public interests, but it also echoes 
the interests of various groups that would benefit from free access to protected materials. 
18 This course of interpretation has its roots in the property rights doctrine. The main rule of IP regulations is 
exclusivity, so derogations from this principle should be interpreted strictly. The CJEU has opened the door for 
more flexible interpretation of exceptions and limitations in the copyright case C‑201/13 Deckmyn v. Vandersteen 
(2014). It has been concluded that the narrow interpretation rule cannot always be applied. It has also been argued 
that the interpretation should not be particularly narrow just like exclusive rights should not be excessively wide. 
Each should have the meaning and scope that was intended for them. This would be especially true for cases where 
the competing interests are fundamental rights. The CJEU has also given a wide interpretation to the exception to 
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exceptions. Recent trends in law and politics have called for more equal treatment to all relevant 
rights.19 There are often important public interests behind the limitations, so it might not always 
be justified to presume priority of IPRs whenever a use does not fall within the very core of the 
exception. This phenomenon has been especially visible in copyright, where the public has 
increasingly experienced that the scope and duration of copyright does not correspond current 
values.20  
Patents have been subject to similar criticism, although not as visibly as copyright. Rather, the 
public concerns relating to patents have materialized in the form of competition law measures 
and abuse allegations.21 Competition interests are important grounds for limiting the exercise of 
patent rights.22 However, they are just one way of limiting possible harmful side effects of 
extensive IP protection. The most traditional way would be not granting patents to inventions 
that might have socially hazardous effects. Such exclusion from patent protection applies e.g. 
to "immoral" inventions like commercial applications of human embryos.23 
More flexible balancing results when only patent enforcement is subject to limitations. It is a 
classical question whether the grant of (intellectual) property rights should be limited or whether 
just the enforcement of those rights should be limited. Nowadays the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) forbids the categorical exclusion of 
pharmaceuticals from patentable subject-matter, so the consideration of public interests 
inevitably shifts towards the exercise phase.24 In addition to competition law measures, 
                                                          
patentability in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC in case C-34/10 Brüstle v. Greenpreace (2011) based on 
moral and ethical arguments. Thus, there seems to be room for questioning the narrow interpretation rule also in 
patent law. See Peukert 2015 p. 145–146, European Copyright Society 2015 p. 133. 
19 Oesch 2017 p. 8. 
20 Id. p. 10; Oker-Blom 2013 p. 1356–1357. 
21 See Hervey & McHale 2015 p. 278–281 for examples of European competition law actions concerning 
pharmaceutical patents. 
22 This is because IPRs give the rights holder a chance to monopolize the invention. Even though this monopoly 
would be limited in scope and time, the adverse effects of such market setting need to be minimized. This is done 
by applying behavioral requirements on the patentee so that IP protection does not excuse grossly anti-competitive 
practices. However, in practice most patents do not result in a monopoly, because there are substitutive, competing 
products. The problem of monopolies is usually only activated in the context of standard essential patents and 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological inventions. See Matthews & Gurgula 2016 p. 666; Minn 2018b p. 109; 
Kathuria & Lai 2018 p. 358. 
23 This exclusion can be found in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC on legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions. 
24 According to TRIPS, patents must be available in all fields of technology. However, some countries have set up 




limitations can be imposed on patent enforcement by reserving injunctive relief to cases where 
it does not significantly interfere with public interest. A more robust measure would be to issue 
compulsory licenses. 
The EU is a direct signatory of TRIPS, so Member States are not allowed to interpret it 
differentially from the statements of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The 
TRIPS Agreement is governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and thus is part of a 
larger framework. TRIPS covers all central aspects of IP, from grant to enforcement. As a result 
of this, patent law is increasingly not just national law, although granted patents remain national. 
Thus, it is not that simple to change any core aspects of it, although some national margin of 
appreciation remains. In addition to this wide harmonization, IP also enjoys human rights 
protection as a form of property. As a first conclusion, patent rights are very established, uniform 
and highly esteemed in the EU. 
2.1.2 Intellectual Property as Human Right 
Property, including IP, is protected as a human right in various human and fundamental rights 
instruments.25 One of these is the Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1(1)) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), which grants the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The 
status of IP as a human right and a non-discriminable form of property has been established in 
the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), but sometimes the nature of IP 
can be a decisive factor in the case.26 IP has gained a strong legal protection in part because it is 
protected under the general property clauses. A weaker form of IP protection is also found in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).27 
                                                          
25 Mattews 2015 p. 497. In older literature the fundamental rights protection for IP was mostly framed through 
effective legal remedies and fair trial instead of pure property protection. Despite this it was recognized that courts 
must consider the fundamental rights aspects when deciding IP cases. See Norrgård 2002 p. 56–57. 
26 Geiger & Izyumenko 2018 p. 78. For example, whether copyright exists will be established by a court and the 
court has the authority to interpret the threshold of originality according to its own standards. Thus, if the court 
says that no copyright exists, there can be no infringement or violation of P1(1). In the case of physical property, 
no similar "pseudo rights" occur. In addition, the ECHR and the CFR do not protect a right to acquire either physical 
or intellectual possessions. See Peukert 2015 p. 137. 
27 Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR protects the moral and material interests of authors in their scientific, literary or artistic 
productions. This does not correspond to modern patent protection, but it confirms that the interests of the inventor 
must be balanced with those of the public in access to the invention. Hestermeyer 2007 p. 158. 
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Failure of states to provide effective means to enforce IP has been considered a violation under 
both P1(1) and Article 6 of the ECHR.28 Some have expressed fears that the human rights 
protection of IP would make its protection unpractically wide and hinder application of useful 
limitations. So far such fears have not materialized, and it is likely that the ECtHR would allow 
limitations in the name of public interest – after all, IP exists to serve a social function and not 
just economic interests.29 Like many other human rights, it can be limited proportionally on 
acceptable grounds.30 
Protection of IP is also part of the EU legal order through the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFR), which is assigned the same value as the Founding Treaties.31 Its Article 17(2) states that 
intellectual property shall be protected. This provision has been criticized because of its 
ambiguity, but the CJEU has been able to shed some light on its meaning.32 In its case law 
concerning copyright infringements on the internet, the CJEU has referred to Article 17(2) and 
stated that it does not mean that IP protection should be absolute, but that it should be 
proportional and subject to a fair balance with other interests.33 This is consistent with the 
conclusions made from general human rights law. Human rights protection of property does not 
"imply a specific scope of IP protection".34 
Yet, the line of argumentation that the CJEU has adopted puts emphasis on the various 
obligations for IP protection resulting from international treaties and EU instruments. This tends 
to happen at the cost of utilizing the options for limiting IPRs. These options to limit are also an 
integral part of IP legislation. This results in gradual strengthening of IPRs and dilution of the 
exceptions.35 This is curious taking into account the general trend of enhancing human rights 
protection. One would imagine that the various limitations of IPRs would be very important in 
that respect. Also the role of the EU in the IP field has become very central and EU-related IP 
                                                          
28 Geiger & Izyumenko 2018 p. 76. Article 6 ECHR contains the right to fair trial. 
29 Geiger & Izyumenko 2018 p. 77; Mattews 2015 p. 498; Mylly 2009 p. 27. 
30 Hestermeyer 2007 p. 152. However, IPRs are also treated as "rights" instead of just property, which means that 
"social utility alone is not reason enough to override it." This has an effect on which public interests are acceptable 
for limiting use of IP. See Merges 2011 p. 261. 
31 This is a central part of the developments that have increased the importance of human rights, including IP, in 
the EU. This trend was especially due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, including the TFEU and the CFR. See 
Walkila 2011, Walkila 2015b p. 794. 
32 Grosse Ruse-Khan 2015 p. 72. 
33 Id. p. 73–74. See cases C-275/06 Promusicae and C-70/10 Scarlet Extended. 
34 Peukert 2015 p. 142. 
35 Grosse Ruse-Khan 2015 p. 78. 
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instruments have gained primacy in many respects. In such a setting any national amendments 
to the content of IPRs could be a violation of CFR Article 17(2).36 
2.1.3 Intellectual Property as Entitlement 
IPRs are also a form of entitlement. Like other entitlements, there are two fundamental ways in 
which they can be protected. These are the property rule and the liability rule. Under the property 
rule, the owner has the sole discretion to decide on the use of the asset. They are free to decline 
others the right to engage in certain actions in relation to the asset. In the case of IP, injunctions 
are the enforcement tool mirroring this concept. The liability rule, on the other hand, means that 
anyone can engage in protected actions if they are willing to pay a price. The price is determined 
by a third party, in patent cases e.g. by a court setting the royalty rate. The owner of the asset 
does not have the right to exclude others; they merely have a right to get paid.37  
It is a long-standing debate of the IP field whether IPRs should be governed more by the property 
rule or the liability rule. Traditionally, the property rule has played a major role and injunctions 
have enjoyed a central position in the enforcement palette. Reasons for this include the difficulty 
of estimating the value of different kinds of IP as well as the fact that IP is non-rivalrous and 
can easily be undermined if there is no effective legal protection.38 Those who favor the liability 
rule emphasize the inefficiency of licensing schemes when there are multiple stakeholders 
involved. Also the hold-up problem has been discussed a lot in this context. It refers to using 
the threat of an injunction for pressurizing into unreasonably high license fees.39  
It has been argued that liability rule would be much more efficient and proportionate for 
copyright, if the ultimate aim is to secure an appropriate income for creators.40 For purely this 
purpose, a right to get paid might be more suitable than exclusivity. The liability rhetoric has 
gained more ground recently also in patent cases, especially in the USA because of the eBay 
judgment.41 This has led to differential application of the liability and property rules according 
                                                          
36 Grosse Ruse-Khan 2015 p. 78. However, it can also be argued that the national margin of appreciation is actually 
quite wide from the perspective of fundamental rights. According to this view, the legislator has wide discretion to 
set the exact scope of IPRs as long as the required minimum level is maintained. Current protection has much 
extended from that minimum. See Peukert 2015 p. 144–145. 
37 Seaman 2016 p. 1954–1956. In copyright a liability rule concept is in use through collective rights management. 
38 Id. p. 1956–1957. 
39 Id. p. 1957–1958. 
40 Mylly 2015 p. 109. Copyright is already largely managed though collective societies that grant a license to 
anyone who is willing to pay an appropriate fee. Still, the starting point in legislation is the right to exclude. 
41 Seaman 2016 p. 1959. See case 547 U.S. 388 eBay v. MercExchange (2006). 
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to the status of the parties and the industry they represent.42 The relationship of property and 
liability rules in the context of pharmaceutical patents is very central for this study. 
2.2 Right to Exclude as a Fundamental Right of the Patent Owner 
2.2.1 Exclusion as the Core of a Patent 
Traditionally IPRs equal a right to exclude. According to Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
patent owners have exclusive rights to prevent others from using the patented invention. These 
rights take their most concrete form in an injunction, which judicial authorities must have an 
authority to issue in response to patent infringement (Article 44 TRIPS). The exclusive rights 
can be subject to limitations as long as they "do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties" (Article 30 TRIPS). Since the 
"exclusive right to prevent" is virtually the only right granted to patent owners, it seems justified 
to call exclusion the core of patent law.  
But what is the status of the right to exclude under the human rights protection of IP? In human 
rights discourse calling something the core of a right implies that there would also be a more 
relatively protected "rest". This idea of a non-negotiable core of human rights can be extracted 
from the practice of the ECtHR.43 Yet, it is not simple to distinguish the absolute core from this 
"rest". Literally interpreted, the core of a right would be the part that cannot be limited in any 
circumstances, whereas the rest would be protected relatively depending on circumstances and 
subject to balancing with other interests.44 In human rights language, calling right to exclude the 
core of patent law would imply that this right cannot be substantially limited. At the same time 
it is quite clear that patents do not belong to the category of absolute rights, nor is the right to 
exclude absolute, although traditionally very strong.45   
The ECtHR also supports a relative interpretation of the very essence of rights, so the extent of 
protection may depend on circumstances.46 Since protection of IP is part of the protection of 
property, it seems more likely that the ECtHR would interpret the core from the perspective of 
                                                          
42 Id. p. 2006. 
43 Christoffersen 2015 p. 26. 
44 Ibid. 




the entire Article. This core would most likely be something about illegitimate deprivation of 
property, for example sudden nullification of patents. This would be a violation of a different 
level than mere limitation of exclusivity. At this stage I simply note that public interest in health 
rights might be an acceptable basis for limiting patent rights independent of any core status of 
exclusivity, because health rights are also human rights and thus neither necessarily enjoys 
primacy over the other. The appropriate balance depends on the circumstances. 
There are also scholars who think that the right to exclude is actually not necessary or central to 
a patent. Rather, it is an "incident" following from the "privilege" of use that the patent 
encompasses.47 The idea of a privilege is consistent with the historical background of patents 
not as subjective rights but as tools to promote public interests of the geographical area.48 From 
the privilege perspective it would be easier to justify limitations to patent enforcement, because 
then there would be no direct interference with any alleged fundamental rights. The right to 
exclude is a traditional and fundamental part of current patent protection, but it might not be 
absolute or necessary in all circumstances. 
2.2.2 Balancing with Public Interests 
Patent law as a whole is no stranger to balancing public interests: the very idea of a patent is to 
grant temporally limited exclusivity in order to promote innovation and knowledge-sharing.49 
Yet, patent laws traditionally do not refer to public interests or any form of general balancing. 
They merely grant rights to the patentee. As can be seen from Article 30 TRIPS, exceptions to 
the right to exclude are subject to quite strict scrutiny.50 This might be part of the reason why 
TRIPS has been criticized of constantly widening the scope of IP protection.51 This is the case 
                                                          
47 Gervais 2015 p. 96. 
48 Hestermeyer 2007 p. 21. Patents have their background in privileges granted by the state. They were not 
subjective rights of the patent owner. Rather, the goal was to promote introduction of new technology to the society, 
and the privilege guaranteed that the invention was published so that new innovation could be built upon it. The 
notion that the inventor has a right to a patent is relatively new. 
49 Sellin 2015 p. 462. 
50 For example, according to established interpretation, the limitedness of exceptions should be evaluated in terms 
of how they limit the exclusive rights, not the economic impacts of the exception. Also, only interests of the patent 
holder are considered under “normal exploitation” and it seems that the patentee is likely to prevail if they have 
any compelling interest in keeping the invention exclusive. Hestermeyer 2007 p. 235–237. 
51 The widening is also a result of so-called TRIPS Plus Agreements the aim of which is to extend the rights of the 
patentee from those guaranteed by the TRIPS. These have been perceived to act especially in the benefit of 
multinational pharmaceutical companies. See Helfer & Austin 2011 p. 125. 
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even though the TRIPS Agreement does not solely promote interests of the inventor, but also 
calls for a balance of rights and obligations (Article 7 TRIPS).52 
Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement mentions that measures may be adopted to protect e.g. public 
health, but only so far as such provisions are consistent with TRIPS. This is not a general 
exception clause, but it can guide the implementation and interpretation of the Agreement.53 
This was also stated in the 2001 Doha Declaration,54 which included the statement that the 
"TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health".55 Thus, states have definitely not intended to set IP above other societal interests, 
although this has sometimes appeared as a consequence of the robust enforcement mechanisms 
provided for IP and under the WTO framework. 
Enforcing a patent is a fundamental and legitimate right. As such it cannot be extensively limited 
or considered abusive, although patent enforcement may sometimes undermine developments 
that the society perceives as beneficial. It is a different matter if a company tries to e.g. 
misleadingly enforce expired patents with the aim of preventing competition.56 Exclusivity is 
the natural benefit coming with a patent. This is the case despite the fact that the liability rule 
(right to get paid) has been gaining more attention in certain industries and jurisdictions. Such 
developments have been visible e.g. in collective copyright management for a long time, but for 
patents exclusivity still contains important value and patents (like other IP) are still defined 
through it in international treaties and national laws. 
Under the ECHR, IP can be both protected from interference but also limited in relation to other, 
more important rights.57 For example, the European Commission of Human Rights 
(ECommHR; predecessor of the ECtHR) has found the grant of a compulsory license for a 
                                                          
52 The TRIPS Agreement contains several flexibilities that can theoretically be utilized to promote public health. 
These include the objective and principle provisions, exhaustion, exceptions to patent rights and compulsory 
licenses. See Matthews 2011 p. 17. 
53 Sellin 2015 p. 453–454. 
54 Although the legal power of the Doha Declaration has been questioned. See e.g. Hestermeyer 2007 p. 279–281. 
There have also been several other decisions that have tried to address the issues regarding strong IP protection and 
public health. 
55 Doha Declaration para. 4. 
56 Some scholars have argued that competition law should be used more vigorously in cases that exhibit anti-
competitive features. Even when the employed strategies are as such lawful, their anti-competitive aims and 
harmful effects should give cause for interference. See den Exter 2010 p. 128; Matthews & Gurgula 2016 p. 666. 
57 Grosse Ruse-Khan 2015 p. 79. 
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pharmaceutical patent lawful when pursuing other important interests in a proportional 
manner.58 This is interesting for the topic of this thesis, because it confirms that the use of IP 
can be substantially limited without violation of the fundamental rights of the IP owner. In a 
way, the key is proportionality and balancing of the conflicting interests. The graver the public 
need for the use of IP, the larger interference can be justified. 
The requirement for proportionality and least restrictive means is highlighted in the ECtHR case 
Balan v. Moldova (2008), where the author's legally recognized copyright had been violated, 
when the state had printed a photograph on ID cards without permission. The state should have 
respected the IP of the author, and it could have easily asked for a permission or picked another 
photograph had the author refused.59 Thus, the public interest in the use of the photograph did 
not prevail over the author's IPR. The national courts had "failed to strike a fair balance between 
the interests of the community and those of the applicant, placing on him an individual and 
excessive burden".60  
Drawing from this, it is clear that not all kinds of public interests are important enough to justify 
overriding the right to exclude, even if there are some that do. The public interest argument is 
not a discussion stopper that can be used by states to allow IP infringements when it is 
convenient for the public. This would constitute a violation of P1(1). The extent of interference 
must be proportional to the graveness of the public interest. This is in line with the initial idea 
that public health interests might sometimes entitle the court to deny a pharmaceutical patent 
injunctive relief. However, the bar for justified interference is set quite high and one might argue 
that it is practically never exceeded in developed countries that have a steady supply of essential 
medicines. Before considering health rights in more detail, the topic of exclusivity will be 
discussed specifically from the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry. 
                                                          
58 Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v. the Netherlands (1990). 
59 Grosse Ruse-Khan 2015 p. 80–81. 
60 Balan v. Moldova (2008) para. 46. In this case it was clear that the state had other options. The interest in using 
that particular photograph could not be very material. Same cannot be said in all cases that involve public health. 
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2.3  Exclusivity and Implications for Pharmaceutical Patents 
2.3.1 Realities of Innovative Pharmaceutical Business 
Pharmaceuticals are a societally important and economically valuable market both globally and 
in the EU.61 The industry is known for extremely high R&D costs: bringing to market a new 
drug can cost over $2.5 billion.62 Then again, pharmaceuticals are also extremely profitable.63 
The industry is very competitive, although risky because of the uncertainty related to 
development of new drugs.64 
Patents are important assets for innovative pharmaceutical companies for the protection of their 
novel products. Patent rights are meant to reward innovators, but also to encourage further 
innovation. To balance the reward of an exclusive market with public interests (such as effective 
competition), the period of patent protection is temporally limited to 20 years.65 This period 
must be put to use effectively by pharmaceutical companies to cover the costs put to R&D. 
Pharmaceutical patents and the practices of innovative pharmaceutical companies have attracted 
lots of criticism over the years. One perspective has been that public health interests are too 
important to be even theoretically exposed to abusive monopolies. For this reason, many 
countries used to not allow patent protection for pharmaceuticals, at least not directly.66 Since 
then the situation has changed, and patents must be available in all fields of technology (Article 
27(1) TRIPS). The change was less welcome in countries that had strong public policies 
promoting access to medicine, such as India.67 States can no longer sovereignly control all 
policies that affect access to medicines. Part of that control is in the hands of pharmaceutical 
companies and their business decisions.68 
There are practical reasons why pharmaceutical patenting is also promoted. Some have even 
argued that pharmaceuticals are one of the few businesses genuinely in need of exclusive 
                                                          
61 den Exter 2010 p. 125; Tuominen 2012 p. 541–542. 
62 Stiefel & Carter 2016 p. 1. 
63 den Exter 2010 p. 127–128.  
64 Helm 2009 p. 39. 
65 Minn 2018a p. 17. 
66 Boscheck 2015 p 222. An example of indirect patent protection is the Finnish analogous process patent that 
allowed the protection of a process for the manufacture of a novel pharmaceutical. The same product could be 
manufactured without infringing the patent by a process not described in the patent. Before 1995 this was the only 
form of patent protection available for pharmaceutical products in Finland. See Norrgård & Bruun 2007 p. 697. 
67 Matthews 2015 p. 500–501. 
68 Lee & Hunt 2012 p. 220–221. 
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rights.69 Pharmaceutical development is tremendously expensive, especially in the clinical trials 
phase. A big portion of the patent term goes to waste because of the long authorization 
procedure, and even supplemental protection certificates (SPCs) cannot completely compensate 
for it. Once the pharmaceutical has been granted a marketing authorization, it is often relatively 
cheap to manufacture.70 Without patent protection, any company could start copying the 
product, pulling the price down and taking a market share away from the originator company. 
As a result, there would be no way to recover the costs put into the research and authorization 
phases. This would strongly discourage innovation.71  
This is why big, innovative pharmaceutical companies tend to focus in their patent strategies to 
the maintenance of exclusivity for their key products. In short, exclusivity is needed to make the 
R&D investments worthwhile. These companies have many kinds of strategies dedicated to this 
aim, from patenting practices to use of administrative procedures and patent enforcement. Some 
of these tactics have also raised controversies. The Commission has condemned some of them 
as anti-competitive or abusive,72 but this does not apply to the entire business or all companies.  
R&D of innovative companies traditionally focuses on so-called blockbusters, which are 
patented, bestselling products aimed at a large population.73 For many years experts have 
predicted the downfall of the blockbuster business model and a shift towards more personalized 
treatments and biological medicines that are harder to copy and reproduce.74 All these 
predictions have not come true yet, and even if they do, patent expiry and circumvention remain 
a relevant issue for innovative companies.75 Overall, innovative pharmaceutical business is very 
dependent on patents and the exclusivity they provide.76 The dependency on patent protection 
makes it crucial for innovative companies to have effective enforcement practices. 
                                                          
69 Posner 2012. 
70 This, of course, depends on the product. Small-scale production can remain expensive. 
71 Posner 2012. 
72 See e.g. case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v. Commission. 
73 den Exter 2010 p. 127–128. 
74 Song & Han 2016 p. 3. However, patents on complex biological products can also be hard to defend because of 
the variety of starting materials and methods of measurement. 
75 McDermott 2012 p. 25. 
76 With this in mind, many pharmaceutical companies have honed their innovation processes so that they are able 
to patent improvements of existing products (called follow-on patents or second generation patents) and thus benefit 
from multiple overlapping patent terms. Especially some generics companies have argued that these patents do not 
actually benefit the society and merely exist to maintain exclusivity and high profits for innovators. This is not the 
whole story, though, since second generation pharmaceuticals often exhibit important improvements that produce 
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2.3.2 Enforcement Practices of Innovative Pharma 
Because of the limited patent term and large costs of product development it is important for 
innovative pharmaceutical companies to maintain an exclusive market for as long as possible. 
For many big, innovative pharmaceutical companies it is an established strategy to use the 
available means to exclude competition and keep generic products out of the market.77 For this 
aim, they employ a broad range of tactics, vigorous enforcement being one of them.78 
Enforceability is a central aspect of a patent's value – and thus also the company's value.79 
When the goal is to exclude, it is no surprise that pharmaceutical patent owners turn to litigation 
if negotiations and warning letters fail. It is common to apply for a preliminary injunction, 
because if an infringing product makes it to the market, effects on the patentee can be huge.80 
There is even a term for the effects caused by market entry of generic products: "patent cliff" 
refers to the resulting fall of market share and product price.81 This occurs naturally at the time 
of patent (or SPC) expiry, but it can be advanced if infringing products are allowed on the 
market. This is why patent owners are very eager to stop infringements at an early phase, 
preferably before market entry. Thus, it can be a normal strategy to take infringement cases to 
court very quickly upon detection. 
Of course, when speaking of patent disputes, it must be kept in mind that only a small portion 
of the actual disputes end up with a court judgment. Many cases are settled, so only in a limited 
amount of cases the court has had the possibility to state something about injunctive relief. 
Typically, when both parties have a similar idea of what the court would decide, the willingness 
to settle increases.82 In those cases that do end up in court, the goal is often to obtain an 
                                                          
value for patients. Moreover, the patent system is also meant to promote minor improvements and not just 
revolutionary discoveries. Ng 2009 p. 459; Helm 2009 p. 40–41, 50; Golden 2014 p. 2114–2115. 
77 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 2009 paras. 540-541. 
78 Matthews & Gurgula 2016 p. 665; Song  & Han 2016. 
79 The real value of a pharmaceutical patent often does not lie in its basic economic value. Instead the big deal is 
the leverage it gives, in practice the right to exclude competition and to set prices, and the threat of litigation. It is 
thus not just about the quality and technological significance of the patent. Minn 2018a p. 18; Feldman & Price 
2014 p. 794. 
80 den Exter 2010 p. 132. 
81 Broes et al. 2016 p. 21. 
82 Seaman 2016 p. 1980. This is also visible in how litigation concerning a particular product can be running in 




injunction that allows exclusion of the infringer. Also in settlements innovator companies tend 
to pursue continuance of their exclusivity.83 
All in all it can be said that injunctions are a valuable tool for innovative pharma. They are in 
practice the only tool that reserves the market for the innovator and allows effective exclusion 
of infringers. In the traditional business model licensing is quite rare and companies resort to 
their right to exclude. The availability of injunctions is thus a topic of central interest to these 
companies, since it can have long-term effects on their business models and profitability. With 
this background knowledge of IP and the pharmaceutical industry, we move on to discuss the 
content of health rights and their relationship to patents. 
3. Health Rights and Coexistence with Patent Law 
3.1  Health Rights in Legislation 
3.1.1 International Health Rights Framework 
Health rights are a group of health-promoting human rights resulting from various international 
treaties. The Constitution of the World Health Organization states in its preamble that "the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every 
human being" and defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". According to Article 25(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself--, including -- medical care --".84 The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) sets in its Article 12(1) the "right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health". 
Also many national constitutions ensure some level of health protection.85 In instruments that 
do not directly mention health the right to health is covered under the right to life. This is the 
                                                          
83 This has raised controversies especially in the context of so-called reverse payment or pay-for-delay agreements, 
where the patent holder pays another company for not infringing their patent. Sometimes the patent might have 
already expired, so the company actually pays for the delay in getting competition. Such arrangements have woken 
the attention of competition authorities for their anti-competitive nature. See Minn 2018b and Matthews & Gurgula 
2016 p. 664. 
84 A similar right is also conferred in the European Social Charter. 
85 Lee & Hunt 2012 p. 220. 
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case with the ECHR.86 The ECHR also mentions protection of health as acceptable grounds for 
interference with certain human rights. 
According to the authoritative interpretation of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), the ICESCR right to health contains the aspects of availability, physical and 
economic accessibility, acceptability (ethics) and quality of healthcare.87 It does not mean a 
"right to be healthy", but it does contain an entitlement to health protection.88 More concretely, 
this protection includes concepts like access to medicines and access to healthcare.89 An obvious 
weakness is that the international human rights framework is poorly enforceable, for it only 
contains a soft monitoring and reporting mechanism. This is noteworthy, because the WTO 
framework – including TRIPS – is subject to an effective dispute settlement mechanism.90 
Access to essential medicines is a universal human right.91 That is the rigid core of the right to 
health.92 On a global scale it is rather poorly realized. An immense amount of people do not 
have regular access to medicines.93 From global perspective the role of patents in this equation 
has been somewhat controversial. It is quite clear that patents increase prices of pharmaceuticals, 
but this is just one part of the wide issues affecting access to medicine in developing countries. 
In these countries there are typically also problems with healthcare infrastructure, resources and 
corruption.94 If the main issues are due to larger societal problems, the question of patent 
enforcement is rather secondary in the big picture. This is why developing countries are not 
discussed extensively in this analysis. 
                                                          
86 The ECtHR considers violations of health rights under Article 2, the right to life, because the ECHR does not 
mention a right to health. For example cases of medical malpractice have been heard under Article 2. See e.g. 
ECtHR case Lopes De Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal (2017) para. 165. This is a form of implicit human rights 
protection. See Neuvonen & Rautiainen 2015 p. 32–36. 
87 CESCR 2000 para. 12. 
88 Id. para. 8. 
89 According to Shadlen, the availability and accessibility of pharmaceuticals is indispensable and cannot be 
substituted by any amount of healthcare. Shadlen et al. 2011 p. 14. 
90 Sellin 2015 p. 453. 
91 WHO: Essential medicines and health products. The international conventions only explicitly protect access to 
essential medicines or access to life-saving medicines. See Hestermeyer 2007 p. 136. 
92 CESCR 2000 para. 43. 
93 Sellin 2015 p. 446. 
94 Ibid. Also these countries typically suffer from lack of classical essential medicines, most of which are not 
protected by patents. See Civan 2008 p. 11. In some cases the issue may also be that relevant medicines do not 
simply exist. Their development would not be profitable for pharmaceutical companies, because the affected people 
would be unable to pay for expensive new treatments. These cases are called neglected diseases. They mean 
diseases that are either too rare to be profitable or that only affect people in poor countries. See Sellin 2015 p. 447. 
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Recently, as the general human rights standards have raised, health rights have attracted more 
attention also in the EU and other developed countries. For example, it has been noted that even 
though common and essential medicines are widely available, not all patients might have access 
to them because of their financial situation.95 There are also many new treatments that could 
benefit patients but that are not accessible to patients for administrative or price-related reasons. 
For the administrative part, there are programs that try to facilitate timely access of patients to 
novel treatments by offering a progressive authorization procedure.96 Financial reasons are 
harder to address, because they depend on each state’s healthcare system and policy. 
While the right to access essential medicines is widely recognized, it is much more controversial 
whether access to novel medicines also belongs to the human rights framework. Novel 
medicines are generally well available in developed countries, but many people do not have 
access to them because of high prices.97 This includes both cases where the patient cannot afford 
an out-of-pocket payment and cases where the national health system cannot afford to offer a 
particular treatment to its users.98 Such high prices have been statistically connected to patent 
protection.99 The health benefits of novel treatments are attainable in the EU in the literal 
sense,100 but it might not be a violation of the right to health to not have access to them. This 
dilemma will be further elaborated in forthcoming sections.  
3.1.2 Content of European Health Rights 
In the EU, health rights can be derived from human rights instruments as well as the founding 
treaties. According to Article 168(1) TFEU, "a high level of human health protection shall be 
ensured in -- all Union policies and activities". On the other hand, Article 168(7) TFEU states 
that the "Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition 
of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care". 
In practice this means that the Member States have quite a lot of discretion in how they organize 
                                                          
95 Minn 2018a p. 16. 
96 See EMA: Adaptive pathways. Adaptive pathways are a set of tools that make it possible for patients to access 
novel treatments that have not gone through the entire authorization procedure yet e.g. because clinical trials are 
hard to conduct because the relevant patient population is so small. 
97 Minn 2018a p. 16. In this respect the situation in Europe is not as bad as e.g. in China, where medicines are also 
well available but too pricy for most patients. See Watanabe & Shi 2011 p. 280–282. 
98 Owoeye & Owoeye 2018 p. 51. 
99 Id. p. 52. 
100 Referring to the "highest attainable level of health". 
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their health systems and enable access to health.101 What the Article reinsures from an EU 
perspective is that health is a relevant interest that can be taken into account in EU decisions 
and policies. 
On the human rights side, health rights are set in Article 35 of the CFR. According to the Article, 
"everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical 
treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices". The Article also 
echoes the same EU policy statements as Article 168(1) TFEU. It does not directly give an 
individual the possibility to question national healthcare policies, but leaves the ultimate choices 
to the Member States.  
The adoption of the ECHR and the CFR – the concrete and legally powerful instruments – has 
improved to status of human rights as part of the substantive, applicable law. The role of human 
rights remains on the rise in the EU: the CFR has the status of primary law and the EU is looking 
to join the ECHR as an official party.102 Thus, the effect of human rights on all fields of law can 
only increase in the near future.103 The Commission has recognized health as a human right and 
the importance of having an EU health policy in order to respond to current health challenges.104 
Health has thus gained a more concrete and independent position in EU law instead of being 
merely a general principle rising from the ECHR and constitutional traditions.105 
The pharmaceutical market in the EU is very fragmented due to different national policies and 
the variety of products for different conditions.106 As a consequence of this and the available 
tools, the proprietors of novel pharmaceuticals have the chance to maintain a strong exclusive 
position in their relevant product markets. Profitable product prices are determined by the 
expenditure of the development process. In practice this means that medicines can be available 
in the EU, but the market setting contributes to high prices, which diminishes actual access. 
                                                          
101 This is consistent with the traditional interpretation of the content of social rights. Neuvonen & Rautiainen 2015 
p. 49. 
102 Walkila 2015b p. 794–799. All the Member States already are parties. 
103 Smith 2015 p. 55. It has even been noted that the high standard of human rights within the EU framework could 
operate to raise the overall bar for human rights compliance. The level of human rights protection required under 
the ECHR is minimum protection, but the interpretations of the ECtHR tend to assume a quite high level of 
protection, because the interpretations are context-dependent. If the general standards rise too high, it might cause 
difficulties for less developed countries. Smith 2015 p. 60. 
104 White Paper 2007. 
105 Hervey & McHale 2015 p. 160–166. 
106 Tuominen 2012 p. 541. 
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Proprietors also have a lot of discretion as to which markets to enter, so a novel pharmaceutical 
might not be available in all Member States. Negotiations with national authorities over the 
reimbursement status of a product determine the consumer price and also give the companies 
some prospect of which markets will be most profitable. The outcomes of these negotiations are 
influenced by local health policies and priorities.107 
A very difficult question for the EU is how it can promote both access to medicines and 
innovative pharmaceutical business. It seems that increasing access to medicines will almost 
directly decrease incentives for pharmaceutical innovation. Then again, in the long run 
innovation will improve effectiveness and availability of different medicines.108 The picture is 
even more complex than this. Patent – and more broadly IP – policy must be reconciled with 
sustainable development of the society as a whole, this including cultural, social and 
environmental objectives. The role of IP in these efforts should also be viewed critically.109 
Strengthening of human rights is a trend visible in many EU policies and it is reasonable to 
assume that health, too, will gain even more ground as an independent value in the future.110 An 
eye should be kept on how this will combine with the promotion of IP protection and 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
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3.2 Conflict of Fundamental Rights? 
3.2.1 Conflict or Coexistence? 
This section discusses the extent of the conflicts and tensions between patents and health rights. 
Both IP law and human rights law have significantly strengthened and widened in scope in the 
past decades.111 Traditionally they have been perceived as isolated bodies of law, but along with 
their spreading interaction has become inevitable.112 IP is now incorporated into the frameworks 
of the WTO with the TRIPS Agreement, which has become a fundamental treaty governing 
essential features of IP. At the same time, human rights documents have increased their 
importance both nationally and internationally. In Europe, the ECtHR is an important source of 
case law.113 The CFR has gradually become a significant reference point for the CJEU, 114 which 
has begun to employ human rights argumentation in its judgments115 also in IP cases.116 Peaceful 
approximation of these two fields would require symbiotic use of both of them, but the 
international trade community has been quite reserved in including human rights or social justice 
arguments into its discourse.117 On the other hand, human rights promoters have put a lot of 
effort in criticizing pharmaceutical companies and wide patent protection without properly 
giving credit to the legitimate interests of IP holders. 
It is a long-standing debate whether human rights and IPRs are essentially in conflict or whether 
they complement each other.118 Conflict does not merely refer to the incompatibility of some 
provisions, but it also covers more general tensions, like promotion of one goal at the expense 
of another.119 The UN human rights system has sometimes endorsed the conflict approach being 
of the view that IPRs essentially stand in the way of realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights, including health.120 Conflicts with rights to health and life are seen to arise as a result of 
extensive pharmaceutical patent protection.121 As a solution it has been suggested that human 
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rights be raised above property rights in international law122 – a primacy not officially in 
place.123 Although health rights can be valued morally superior to property rights, their 
enforcement possibilities remain weak and they cannot be said to have gained a jus cogens 
status.124  
According to the coexistence doctrine, human rights and IPRs inhabit the same field and strive 
towards solving the same problems, but they tend to draw somewhat different conclusions. The 
tension lies between simultaneous promotion of exclusivity (representing the incentive to create 
and innovate) and access of public to the creations and innovations.125 This approach recognizes 
that IP serves a social function and thus the interests of private authors and inventors should be 
balanced with those of the public.126 To reach this aim, it is crucial that the applicable exceptions 
and limitations are flexible, appropriate in scope and properly utilized.127 This might not always 
be the case, if the fundamental protection of property is interpreted too strictly or the minimum 
level of IP protection is strengthened by only considering interests of the right holder.128 In 
current international law, the coexistence approach is widely accepted and the presumption is 
usually against conflict.129 
3.2.2 Different Natures of Patents and Health Rights 
Even though both patents and health rights are recognized as legitimate interests and 
fundamental rights, it should also be noted that their natures are essentially different. Patent law, 
being more robust and enforceable, should perhaps incorporate other societal interests as 
balancing tools. However, the current IPR system was not created with the view of balancing 
IPRs with (other) human rights.130 It can thus be questioned whether current patent laws 
incorporate proper human rights protection. It would seem that application of IP rules requires 
some balancing with human rights interests, since IP legislation does not as such promote human 
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rights aims.131 A more difficult dilemma is to recognize and agree on when additional balancing 
is required and when the basic rules provide adequate protection for all interests.  
The discussion concerning patents and health rights has perhaps been the most prevalent debate 
concerning the relationship of IP and human rights.132 The UN Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights has specifically stated that the TRIPS Agreement does not currently implement the 
indivisibility of human rights, including the right to health.133 These views arose especially in 
response to the HIV epidemics of late 20th century, where the conduct of some pharmaceutical 
companies was seen to worsen the situation for patients.134 This setup awoke many patent-
critical voices and has been affecting the public image of pharmaceutical companies even after 
the incidents. 
Drawing especially form this context, it must be admitted that IPRs differ in a few central ways 
from "basic" human rights, even though they often are guaranteed in the same legal documents. 
These differences have been extensively pointed out by the CESCR: 
"Human rights are fundamental as they derive from the human person as such, whereas 
intellectual property rights derived from intellectual property systems are instrumental, in that 
they are a means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity 
from which society benefits. In contrast with human rights, intellectual property rights are 
generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else. While 
intellectual property rights may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and 
even forfeited, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human 
person. Whereas human rights are dedicated to assuring satisfactory standards of human welfare 
and well-being, intellectual property regimes, although they traditionally provide protection to 
individual authors and creators, are increasingly focused on protecting business and corporate 
interests and investments."135 
The core differences can be highlighted as characterizing patents as inherently instrumental 
whereas health rights are an end in themselves. Furthermore, attention can be drawn to the 
position of property rights as state-derived and human rights as "natural" or "indispensable". 
According to some, these differences account for the fact that IP and human rights should not 
be balanced as if they were equal.136 Taking into account these core differences, it must be 
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concluded that health interests should sometimes be able to override patent protection and thus 
restrict the use of IPRs.137 
Human rights have already affected the scope of IPRs during recent decades, although these 
effects are not the most prevalent in patent law. Still, patent law is no longer an independent and 
technical body of law. Human rights concerns have penetrated the IP field with varying degree 
of strength and must be effectively addressed. It can also be seen as a positive thing that IP law 
is forced to reconsider and defend the values it represents.138 In this way, better compromises 
and more up-to-date rules can be formulated. 
3.2.3 Effects of Human Rights on IP Law 
Human rights have had various effects on the IP field. There are some that would prefer that the 
effects remain abstract. This approach treats the ICESCR merely as a guideline or a "promotion 
for good practices".139 According to this view, the UN human rights are ill suited for 
enforcement and should not be used as a basis for litigation. This is because they are both 
ambitious and ambiguous: Highest attainable level of health is very different for countries with 
different levels of income. The same standards for assessing adequacy and violation cannot 
possibly be applied for all countries and yet the ultimate goal should be the same for all, because 
it is about a human right.140 Although there is a point in this approach, the notion of ICESCR as 
mere guidelines has been received with suspicion.141 
The rise of human rights has made balancing different interests a more frequent task in many 
fields of law, including IP.142 This balancing often resembles political decision-making, since it 
is based on the values of the person striking the balance. There are no absolute rights or wrongs 
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in where the balance should be.143 This is why the balancing questions cannot be answered just 
by legal dogmatic but require a law and politics approach and deliberate choices. 
According to Matthews,144 the effects of human rights on the IP field can be divided into three 
thematic clusters: legislative changes, policy changes and judicial interpretations. Legislative 
changes cover the implementation of new statutory rules. Sometimes the legislator tries to 
maintain the previous policy or values despite the change. Such policy maintaining phenomenon 
was observed in India's implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, which did not allow the 
complete exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patentability.145  
Policy changes refer to changes in how public authorities act and what they promote without 
any legislative changes necessarily taking place. This has happened in Brazil in response to the 
HIV epidemic and high prices of patented anti-retroviral drugs. The public authorities took a 
big role in negotiating down the prices of the drugs so that access could be provided for all.146 
Policy changes have also taken place in Europe, when competition authorities have started to 
react to some anti-competitive practices of pharmaceutical companies.147 
Lastly, judicial interpretations can change the state of affairs without any official changes in 
legislation or public policy.148 This happens by natural or conscious shifts in how existing legal 
documents are interpreted and valued by judicial authorities. There are numerous examples 
worldwide how consideration of human rights has changed established case law and given room 
for new kinds of arguments. The phenomenon has made constitutional and human rights 
provisions directly applicable in courts.149  This has also happened in the CJEU's argumentation 
in IPR cases, especially copyright cases. In patent law it is yet to happen. 
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From these clusters the focus of this thesis is on the judicial interpretation and the courts' 
possibilities to change the existing balance between patents and health rights. Legislative 
changes are not covered by this analysis, but some of the discussed measures might also fall into 
the sphere of policy changes. A hypothesis of this analysis is that no legislative changes are 
needed to bring health rights considerations into patent law. Desired balancing methods can be 
adopted by interpreting existing legal sources in a new way. 
3.3 Combining Health Rights and IP 
3.3.1 Primacy of Health over Property 
3.3.1.1 Are All Human Rights Equal? 
This section is dedicated to discussing the human rights concepts that would allow health rights 
to have a bigger role in European patent law.150 First, I contemplate whether health rights could 
be superior to property rights. The discussion here focuses on the ECHR along with the justified 
reasons for limiting property rights as determined by the ECtHR. 
Let us first consider general conditions for limiting human rights. The ECtHR has given much 
consideration for balancing and proportionality. It has stated that limitation of property rights 
must be made by "reasonable and suited" means, but application of objectively "best" or least 
restrictive measures is not required.151  This is consistent with the ECHR's nature as a provider 
of minimum protection. Simply the fact that more protection could have been provided does not 
constitute a violation of the ECHR.152 States have the right to impose limitations on human 
rights in specific circumstances even if they have chosen not to or even if it is not strictly 
speaking necessary.153  
Additionally, the ECtHR seems to focus almost exclusively on the legitimacy of the aims and 
not so much on the efficacy of the selected means for limitation. In theory, a limitation to human 
rights is disproportionate if it is not actually efficient at pursuing the legitimate aim in question. 
In practice it is understandable that the Court does not wish to engage too much in analyzing 
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large numbers of hypothetical scenarios, so focusing on legitimacy of aims is simpler.154 
However, this suitability test is just one aspect of the more general proportionality assessment 
that the ECtHR exercises.155 What makes this assessment especially hard is the inevitable 
reliance on incomplete or absent empirical data on the effects of different choices.156 Yet, 
exercise of proportionality does not only mean limiting rights.157 It is inherently about balancing 
different interests, and in more difficult cases this balancing is based on conscious choices rather 
than on dictations of law.158 
There are a few superior, non-derogable rights, these including the right to life and prohibition 
of torture, slavery and punishments without law.159 The ECtHR recognizes a hierarchy within 
the ECHR rights e.g. by assigning priority to examination of cases where non-derogable rights 
are breached. Cases involving a risk for the life or health of the applicant are prioritized.160 This 
implies that health is considered to be quite high in the hierarchy, even though it is strictly not 
the very core of the right to life. Of course, harm to health can have long-term effects on the 
quality of life in a different manner than interference with e.g. right to free speech.  
It seems that health as a human right has to some degree primacy over property rights under the 
ECHR. What this means in practice is not that health interests would always prevail over 
property concerns, but that they must be weighed against each other appropriately when 
balancing them in individual cases. This conclusion has also been criticized to reflect merely an 
emotional hierarchy, while legal arguments would rather support the primacy of trade-related 
obligations governed by the WTO. This is because the WTO has enforcement mechanisms that 
are subject to make states behave primarily according to WTO norms. As a solution it has been 
suggested that human rights considerations be properly internalized into the WTO framework, 
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so that they would guide state behavior as equal to trade interests.161 This notion is also relevant, 
but the moral superiority of health rights over property rights should also be taken seriously. 
3.3.1.2 When Does Health Prevail? 
Assuming that health enjoys a primacy of sorts in the human rights hierarchy compared to IP, it 
is logical to ask how and when such primacy would manifest in practice. There have been no 
big cases yet where the central issue would have been about balancing health rights and IP, but 
it seems that the ECtHR would probably be ready to give priority to health – at least if the health 
situation would be grave enough. We can imagine a case where, for example, a patentee claims 
violation of their property rights on the basis that the state has allowed the use of their patented 
pharmaceutical without permission in order to battle e.g. a spreading infectious disease. 
Depending on the urgency of the situation and the type of the disease, the ECtHR might say that 
a monetary compensation for the use has provided enough protection for the IP and that the 
public health interests override the patentee's right to exclude. 
Considering this kind of extreme cases makes the priority of health rights seem quite clear. But 
the applicability of extreme cases to less dramatic scenarios is limited. Injunction is still the 
main rule in European pharmaceutical patent cases and health rights are not a very topical 
concern in these litigations. In the ECHR's practice there are also examples where a superior 
right did not automatically prevail over other human rights.162  This is because the actual 
balancing of human rights also takes into account other factors than just theoretical supremacy. 
In individual cases important factors include the status of parties and the seriousness of the 
interference.163  
All in all, it seems likely that the ECtHR would be willing to consider balancing IP and health 
rights instead of just relying on protection of property, which is directly mentioned in the ECHR 
documents. However, the default level of protection of IP seems to be quite strong in front of 
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the ECtHR. The ECtHR has had a quite positive approach to IPRs especially in cases concerning 
freedom of expression and copyright. Moreover, it has lots of respect for domestic balancing 
decisions, although it does review their proportionality especially in relation to alternative 
measures.164 As the protection of IP is constantly gaining more ground on the domestic and EU 
level, it might be that at some point the ECtHR would be willing to put more emphasis on the 
realization of other human rights and thus narrow down the wide margin of appreciation.165 
It seems unlikely that the current balance would undergo dramatic changes unless a landmark 
judgment would be given. The ECtHR seems like a good forum to issue one, but actually the 
CJEU’s word might have a more direct effect on national practices. The problem with the 
ECtHR’s judgments is that they might remain more abstract and backwards-looking and not 
provide so much general guidance.166 However, thinking especially of the upcoming Unified 
Patent Court (UPC), it might be that the statements of both courts (ECtHR and CJEU) would be 
ignored as far as possible should the patent or WTO community not like them. This has been 
identified as a fear related to the efficacy of any interference to the practices of the UPC from 
non-UPC courts.167 As a conclusion it might still be said that the most likely scenario where 
health rights would openly prevail over IPRs would be some kind of extreme situation. Its result 
might be relatively easy to bypass for general courts dealing with ordinary cases – or not, 
depending on the forum and the way the judgment was formulated. 
3.3.2 Access to Novel Medicines as Human Right 
Another human rights based way to enhance health rights in patent enforcement would be to 
extend the content of the right to health to more clearly also cover access to novel medicines in 
Europe. In practice this would mean that the concept of highest attainable level of health would 
be taken more literally and technically. Traditionally the starting point is that only access to 
essential medicines is actively protected as only access to essential medicines has been 
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mentioned by the WHO and UN organs. It is not nearly as evident that access to novel and 
innovative medicines would merit similar protection as a human right. 
The WHO maintains statistics of the availability and prices of medicines it has listed as essential 
in exemplary manner.168 The model lists of essential medicines also feature medicines more 
important in developed countries – that is, not only medicines against infectious diseases.169 The 
concept of essential medicine is defined as medicines "that satisfy the priority health care needs 
of the population". They are selected "with due regard to disease prevalence and public health 
relevance, evidence of clinical efficacy and safety, and comparative costs and cost-
effectiveness".170 
Looking at the definitions of essential medicines, it is clear that the definition of an essential 
medicine does not rule out the possibility that a novel medicine could also be essential. 
Moreover, the essential medicines of developed countries, including the EU, can be different 
from those of developing countries. This is important to recognize so that we can only consider 
health rights in the EU. This is also consistent with Article 2(1) ICESCR that calls for 
progressive realization of the rights of the Covenant.171 Nowhere is it stated that access to novel 
medicines could not be a human right protected under highest attainable level of health. The 
developed countries are merely ahead some developing countries in realizing the right to health.  
With this in mind, it is not unreasonable to say that the content of the right to health can be held 
to a higher standard in countries with more resources. In the EU for example, healthcare 
standards are generally high and availability of medicines is not a wide-scale issue. Thus, it 
might be argued that the attainable level of health includes access to a wide set of medicines, 
not all of which are strictly essential. Should Member States then take action to facilitate access 
to novel, possibly expensive treatments? In the light of the Article 168 TFEU, such decisions 
are part of the national healthcare policy and do not directly interfere with the right to health as 
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long as healthcare is not completely denied some patients.172 Thus, current EU legislation leaves 
a wide margin of appreciation for the provided level of healthcare. No EU policy actively 
promotes access to novel medicines,173 so such a right remains quite weak even in the EU. 
The tricky question that remains in relation to essential medicines is the exact definition of 
which medicines are truly essential and which are mere "convenience". Cancer is a relevant 
health threat in the EU – so should some novel cancer medicines be held essential? At least 
some novel medicines drop out of the definition of essential because of the cost-related factors. 
Many novel medicines are quite expensive and not that cost-effective if compared to cures for 
simpler diseases. This is relevant, because the resources of national health systems are limited. 
Putting emphasis on one expensive cure can diminish the availability of many cheaper ones and 
might not be socially justifiable.174 
As a conclusion, the right to health currently does not ensure access to all necessary medicines, 
but only those that are essential. The definition of essential varies among countries and it is 
generally much broader in the EU than in many other countries. The right to access novel 
medicines does not exist as such, but some novel and even expensive medicines might be 
considered essential in some circumstances or some parts of the EU. Thus, when issuing 
injunctions, it should be evaluated what the status of the pharmaceutical concerned is for the 
affected patient populations. For example, there are regions of the EU where e.g. a hereditary 
disease affects a relatively high proportion of the population and poses a major public health 
concern in the region.175 For this subpopulation in the EU, the pharmaceutical might be essential. 
If this is the case, then the realization of health rights should be considered in determining 
whether and what kind of injunction should be granted. In situations like this it would seem 
tempting not to issue an injunction at least to the part of the EU where its health effects would 
be most negative. From these examples we move to consider injunctions more concretely and 
from the perspective of patent law. 
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4.  Judicial Discretion in Granting Injunctions 
4.1 The May or Shall Problem 
After considering the more theoretical aspects of the research question, this chapter will take a 
concrete approach and consider injunctions specifically. Injunctions are the ultimate 
embodiment of the right to exclude. With an enforceable injunction the patentee can physically 
prevent the sale or import of infringing products. It is a powerful tool for the patentee. Its use 
can also have visible effects on the society by making an infringing product unavailable for 
consumers. Taking into account its significance, it is understandable that stakeholders and 
scholars have given much thought for whether injunctions should always be issued or not. There 
are arguments for both sides.  
The debate first culminates into the question of whether courts have discretion under current 
legislation not to grant an injunction after an infringement has been established. This is what I 
refer to as the may or shall problem. Typically, the provisions granting courts the power to issue 
injunctions use the wording "the court may grant an injunction". This is frequently interpreted 
as "the court shall grant an injunction". The first part of the issue is thus the legal dogmatic 
question of how the legal provisions should be interpreted taking into account the patentee's 
right to exclude and factors that may sometimes speak against the exercise of that right. Is the 
grant of an injunction supposed to be automatic is discretionary?176 This question and the 
content of what I call a traditional approach will be addressed in the following sections. 
The second part of the problem is the question whether discretion should exist and whether it 
should be exercised – and on what basis. It is possible to argue that the lenient formulation of 
the provisions should be put to use more often. Usually such cases would be those where a 
public interest is involved, for example competition or public health. The exact balance of 
different interests in the exercise of the discretion is tough to strike and cannot be unequivocally 
set in the legislation. Sometimes there are no other compelling interests involved and the 
patentee's right to exclude can be exercised without further considerations. Sometimes 
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exclusivity may seem secondary in the bigger picture. The discussion of these issues will be 
started in this chapter and continued in chapter 5. 
4.2  Traditional Approach to Injunctions 
4.2.1 Right to Exclude in the Light of the Enforcement Directive 
There is no official unified approach to injunctions in Europe, although a common base for 
enforcement measures in the EU has been reached by the Enforcement Directive (Directive 
2004/48/EC). According to Article 3(1) of the Directive, the enforcement "measures, procedures 
and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or 
entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays". Moreover, Article 3(2) requires that the 
"measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and 
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to 
provide for safeguards against their abuse". Hence, the Directive seems to contain the idea of 
balancing different societal interests in the application of the enforcement measures. 
Article 11 concerns injunctions and states that "Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial 
decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities 
may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the 
infringement". Despite this statement that courts "may issue -- an injunction", no conclusions 
can be drawn from this provision on the actual discretion of European courts in granting 
injunctions. This is because the articles of the Directive are directed at the law maker, who must 
then draft the national law to be compliant with the Directive. Thus, what the provision actually 
means is merely that courts "shall have authority" to issue injunctions.177 
Another feature of the Directive worth mentioning here is Article 12. Its implementation was 
voluntary and not many countries have included it in their national patent laws. It contains a 
proportionality exception that only applies to a very narrow set of circumstances.178 Article 3 – 
titled "General obligation" and quoted above – includes the general and primary requirements 
that all provided measures must satisfy independent of whether the national law makes use of 
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the narrower exception of Article 12. Direct application of Article 3 might act as a basis for 
discretion in the grant of injunctions, although in some cases it might activate the problem of 
Directives' horizontal effects and thus might not be a good basis for radical changes on the 
national level.179 
Article 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive specifically allows for discretion of sorts, namely the 
requirement of proportionality of available means. In practice national courts tend to treat the 
rights conferred by a patent as an obligation to issue an injunction if requested. Proportionality 
does not even arise in the discussion, because it is thought to be incorporated into the legislation. 
Even the infringers rarely argue that the grant of an injunction would be disproportionate or 
otherwise contrary to public interest.180 This probably speaks for a practice so established that 
it is not considered fruitful to question. Furthermore, Article 3 also calls for effective and 
dissuasive means and does not specify how these aims should be combined with proportionality. 
Thus, no general guidelines for discretion can be drawn from the Article or the Directive.181 At 
least the current practices are not contrary to the Directive, because the Directive is so 
ambiguous in these respects, but different interpretations could also be justified. 
Article 3 also prohibits abuse of rights and barriers of trade. They could sometimes be used as 
arguments against or in favor of injunctions. None of the countries studied by Marfe et al. – 
Germany, France, Italy and Netherlands – has in their patent law any general proportionality 
requirements nor are there any obvious legal ways to apply such a criterion under national 
law.182 From the "constraints" of Article 3, only the abuse and trade barrier conditions are clearly 
applicable in national courts, the former through general principles and the latter through 
competition and internal market law.183 This might explain why the balancing discussion 
concerning injunctions has been so limited in Europe. 
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Germany, France, Italy and Netherlands all have a strong disposition in granting injunctions 
under their patent laws. Only in exceptional circumstances have other concerns prevailed – for 
example, if an application for injunction has been made during FRAND license negotiations.184 
All of these countries also evaluated themselves to be compliant with the Enforcement Directive 
without major changes to their national patent laws. Similar practices and implementation 
histories are found throughout the EU.185 Thus, the current practices in Europe are in no way a 
result of the Directive. They are part of a much longer tradition and an expression of the property 
rule's effect. According to Norrgård,186 this effect is mirrored in the Directive in the emphasis it 
puts on "high" level of IP protection. Nevertheless, on the level of individual Articles the 
Directive seems to leave a lot discretion for the national judge. Thus, there are no definitive 
rules on either EU or national level, but in practice the right to exclude remains quite absolute. 
4.2.2 Traditional Approach in the USA 
The starting point has been quite similar in the USA as in Europe. This was the case especially 
before the landmark case eBay in 2006. The US Patent Act recognizes the right to exclude as a 
right of the patent owner (35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)). The authority to grant injunctions is based on 
35 U.S.C. § 283 that reads: "courts -- may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of 
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable".  
The injunction provision is as such formulated in a more discretionary way that the 
corresponding European provisions. However, it used to be interpreted according to the "shall" 
doctrine, meaning that an injunction was a more or less automatic consequence of an established 
patent infringement.187 The "right to exclude" had been specifically recognized in a Supreme 
Court case in the 1850s and further expanded to non-practicing patentees in the early 1900s.188 
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General common law principles provided little if any equitable discretion.189 The human right 
status of the right to exclude and the indistinguishability of physical and intellectual property 
had also been recognized in court practice.190 Hence, injunctions used to be the standard remedy 
for patent infringement.191 
In the USA, patent litigation happens mainly in federal district courts, where the court of appeals 
is the Federal Circuit.192 When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, the practice of 
granting permanent injunctions became governed under the precedents of this new court of 
appeals.193 Under the Federal Circuit, it became a firm rule that "an injunction should issue once 
infringement has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it".194 Such 
sufficient reasons were rarely at hand.195 In practice injunctive relief could only be denied in 
very rare instances where public interests were compromised because a patentee would not 
practice the invention.196 The basic presumption used to be that a recurring infringement would 
cause irreparable harm to the patentee and thus injunctions should be issued.197  
The appropriateness of patent remedies has been a much hotter topic in the USA than in the EU, 
generally due to the bigger volume and some peculiarities of the system that together allow a 
larger diversity of high-profile cases to arise. Before eBay, it was widely accepted that the 
issuance of injunctions was justified and belonged to the essence of patent rights.198 Of course, 
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many still support this interpretation. There are several reasons to why this rule was replaced. 
In the USA, the economic arguments related to patent infringement have received a lot of 
attention compared to the more rights-based approach in Europe.199 A general aim of patent 
remedies is to encourage desirable behavior200 and otherwise allow the market to function 
normally.201 This perspective explains where the increasing criticism of the injunction-based 
remedy system might have come from. Especially the emergence of so-called patent trolling202 
encouraged questioning the justification of injunctions. It raised to wider awareness the notion 
that any system with absolute rules is likely to give unsatisfying outcomes in a significant 
portion of cases and thus discretionary legal rules should be favored.203 Many scholars have 
identified additional circumstances that support the idea that the special position of injunctions 
might not be so well-founded and the option to use other remedies better ensures the pursuit of 
common goals.204  
Overall, the injunction principles of the USA used to be quite similar to the EU. Since eBay in 
2006 the situation has changed a lot, as will be discussed in detail in the following sections, and 
discretion has become the new norm. As mentioned above, the US injunction clause is much 
more pointedly discretion-friendly than the European counterparts, reflecting the underlying 
common law traditions. Thus, it was not totally unexpected that the USA would choose to 
activate the full meaning of the provision. Its effects will be analyzed below, but before that 
discretionary systems will be discussed in a general manner. 
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4.3  Rise of Balancing Requirements 
4.3.1 Why Introduce Discretion? 
This section 4.3 will contemplate the reasons why a discretionary approach to injunctions might 
be desirable and what has made it rise to such a hot topic. The right to exclude still enjoys a 
fundamental position in patent law, but the grant of injunctions has invoked lots of discussion 
in several jurisdictions. The big debate is about whether the right to exclude conquers all other 
interests at stake in a patent litigation or whether there should be equitable discretion.  
European courts have typically not paid much attention to the question whether injunctions 
should be granted to patentees who have succeeded at an infringement trial. Injunctions have 
been granted automatically in both continental Europe and the common law systems, although 
the historical basis has been somewhat different.205 Whether the automatic grant of injunctions 
is indeed proportional has not yet been thoroughly tested in the EU.206 As noted above, the 
protection of property has become wider as its human rights status has been confirmed. Yet, it 
can be limited just like other human rights in case a public interest demands it or it must be 
balanced with another human right.207 
The logic behind being very lenient in granting injunctions has been put to words by Klar as 
follows: "Courts' preference to grant permanent injunctive relief in patent law suits stems from 
a belief that once infringement has been established denying a patentee the right to exclude 
others is contrary to the laws of property".208 There are also voices critical of this approach that 
argue that the nature of patents as property does not require that the right to exclude is so strong. 
The incentive to innovate need not suffer if injunctions are replaced by monetary damages. 
Moreover, it would not inevitably produce huge amounts of uncontrollable infringement, if the 
monetary damages are properly sized and readily available.209 
According to some, the issue should be referred to the CJEU in Europe,210 although many patent 
experts are generally unhappy with how the CJEU has dealt with IPRs in the past.211 This general 
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distrust in the CJEU's logic is one of the main reasons why the role of the CJEU was minimized 
within the UPC framework.212 It is particularly the CJEU's rising concern for human rights that 
has not inspired confidence in patent experts.213 Yet, patent law cannot exist in isolation of the 
surrounding society and the CJEU might actually be more competent in taking into account all 
the competing interests than a specialized patent court.214 This is why it might be good if the 
CJEU provided some guidelines for the exercise of discretion – should the discretionary trend 
develop a substantial role in European patent law.  
Especially in the case of pharmaceuticals it could be the human rights concerns that could justify 
the exercise of discretion and possible denial of injunctive relief. As mentioned above, the CJEU 
has become more willing to entertain such arguments and involve human rights rhetoric into its 
judgments. It would be important that the relevant rights are interpreted correctly and 
consistently. The situation is comparable to the use of moral arguments against patent grant: if 
an incompetent forum (i.e., a patent authority) is forced to make extensive judgments of what is 
"desirable", the balance is in danger of becoming distorted.215 Similarly, the balance between 
patent protection (including the right to exclude) and health rights should not be left solely for 
specialized patent courts to address, because it is a value-based assessment affecting the entire 
society. 
Making the right to exclude weaker and subject to a court's discretion would force 
pharmaceutical companies to change strategies and rethink their business models to stay 
profitable. This might not necessarily be a bad thing, but it is clearly not in the interest of 
innovative pharmaceutical companies. Where the balance is struck and how far the innovators 
need to compromise will be a key question for future pharmaceutical business. 
4.3.2 The Case of SEPs and Needs for Balancing 
During the last couple of decades the general trend has been that the right to exclude has become 
less and less absolute. Like many legal movements, this has first arisen in the USA. The court 
practice underwent a radical shift with the eBay judgment of the US Supreme Court,216 and it 
                                                          
212 Ibid. 
213 E.g. criticism of the case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace. See Pila 2015 p. 20. 
214 Pila 2015 p. 21. 
215 Enerson 2004 p. 720. 
216 547 U.S. 388 eBay v. MercExchange (2006). 
42 
 
will be extensively discussed in the following sections. The discretion discussion is still 
blooming. In Europe, similar conversation has started on a more general level now that the 
coming of the UPC provides an opportunity to scrutinize existing practices. So far the discussion 
has been mostly limited to competition-related public interests that are the most prevalent in the 
context of standard essential patents (SEPs). In the context of pharmaceuticals the discretion 
rhetoric remains quite rare, although, as demonstrated in this thesis, there are valid reasons to 
why it might be involved more.  
While approaching the topic of discretion on a more general level, I will briefly describe the 
most relevant points of the SEP discussion to have an image of the dynamics of a sensitive 
balance. The discussion about whether discretion should exist and be exercised has arisen most 
of all in the context of mobile phones and similar multi-function devices.217 The defendants of 
these litigations have argued that it is unreasonable that a single patentee could force the entire 
product out of the market, when the product utilizes hundreds of patents and parts.218 These 
devices typically make use of SEPs, which represent technology that has been set as a standard 
for a specific solution. Compliance with the standard is in practice mandatory inter alia because 
consumers discriminate against non-compliant products.219 This is why standard setting 
organizations require that SEP owners commit to license on so-called FRAND conditions (fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory). This is supposed to promote sharing of standardized 
technology and to minimize the drawbacks of extensive patenting.220  
There are two classical settings that are detrimental to the market and public interest, but can 
result in if patent business does not operate smoothly. The first is called hold-up and it refers to 
a situation where the patentee uses the threat of an injunction to pressurize licensees to pay 
unreasonably high fees. The second is known as hold-out and it means a situation where 
someone uses a patented technology without paying for a license.221 The availability of 
injunctions has a huge effect on the usability of these strategies. If injunctions are readily 
available for all patent owners, the hold-up problem becomes more imminent. Similarly, if they 
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are available only in very rare and specific circumstances, hold-out is more likely since patent 
owners lack effective means to prevent infringement. These issues have been widely discussed 
in the context of SEP licensing, because lots of disputes arise from these settings.222 The 
arguments made about how available injunctions should be has also general relevance for the 
may or shall debate and the relationship of the property and liability rules. 
4.3.3 Controlling the Availability of Injunctions 
The issues highlighted with the SEP cases reflect the need to consciously control the availability 
of injunctions. Even though the right to exclude has typically been very strong, these disputes 
have raised to awareness the idea that granting an injunction might sometimes be so much 
contrary to public interest that the interests of the patent owner could be overridden. This is what 
the discretionary approach would ultimately be about: looking at the specific circumstances of 
each case and finding a balance between different interests.223 
The CJEU has addressed this issue in the context of SEPs in the landmark case Huawei v. ZTE, 
where it set behavioral requirements for both parties of a SEP dispute.224 If these requirements 
are not met, there might be a legitimate reason for an infringement suit or an abuse of a dominant 
position procedure, depending on the party. The balance struck by the CJEU has been further 
refined especially in German court practice.225 Overall, many are of the opinion that applying 
for an injunction is generally not compliant with FRAND obligations.226 This is why some 
standard setting organizations' rules specifically forbid seeking injunctive relief.227 This is 
considered a powerful way to prevent hold-up and instead promote damages as an enforcement 
tool.228 It seems that the liability rule is prevailing in the SEP context also in the EU. 
The use of injunctions by SEP holders has been limited both in the EU and in the USA.229 
Otherwise there are still significant differences in the general approach to injunctions. The 
reasons used for limiting SEP injunctions worldwide include principles of equity, public policy, 
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unfair competition, competition law and abuse of rights.230 So far only the competition law 
argument has been employed by the CJEU, although a few European courts have also invoked 
abuse of rights.231 It has been suggested that interim payments should be favored in SEP cases 
to avoid the drawbacks of injunctions and to discourage hold-out strategies.232 
Applicability of the SEP arguments to pharmaceutical patents is limited, because 
pharmaceutical companies make no commitment of licensing.233 The infringer cannot thus argue 
to have any kind of subjective "right" to use the invention.234 No similar abuse claims can be 
made of pharmaceutical patent enforcement as long as there is no dishonesty involved. A direct 
analogy thus fails, so the possible existence of discretion must be constructed on other 
arguments. To answer the question about pharmaceutical-specific European discretion, I will 
use the US practice as a springboard to understanding what kind of discretion might be 
introduced into the legal system and how it could be applied in practice. Further below, these 
perspectives will be applied to the European discussion. 
4.4  Wide Discretion and eBay Criteria 
4.4.1 Effects of eBay v. MercExchange on Patent Litigation 
In 2006, the US Supreme Court gave a judgment in the matter eBay v. MercExchange.235 In the 
judgment, the Court fundamentally changed the established case law for granting injunctions. 
Instead of them being issued automatically, the Supreme Court extended the traditional four-
factor test to apply to permanent injunctions. In practice this meant that patentees could no 
longer rely on injunctions being issued as a matter of course, but that they have to provide 
evidence that such a remedy is indeed necessary. Before eBay the test had only been used in the 
context of preliminary injunctions.236 
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The four-factor test is a general test applied for the equitable grant of any kind of injunction.237 
According to the test, an injunction should only be issued, if the plaintiff demonstrates "(1) that 
it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction".238 As a result of eBay, this 
test is now used for permanent patent injunctions, too.239 
The eBay case has been vigorously discussed in academia and the criteria are applied by lower 
courts frequently in injunction cases. However, according to empirical studies, most 
infringement cases still end with the grant of a permanent injunction, the overall injunction rate 
post-eBay being somewhere between 70–80 %.240 This rate used to be close to 100 % pre-eBay, 
but has since slowly dropped to just below 70 %.241 However, there are significant differences 
in the statistics of different courts, their injunction grant rates varying between 50–92 %. Part 
of these differences is explained by the type of cases these jurisdictions deal with.242 
There are major differences in grant rates depending on industry. Pharmaceutical cases nearly 
always result in an injunction while computer software cases rarely do.243 In the decade 
following eBay, the injunction grant rate was the highest for biotechnology (100 %) and 
pharmaceutical (92 %) patents.244 As a comparison, the grant rate for medical devices was only 
65 %, which is interesting, because they are also susceptible to similar public health interests as 
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pharmaceuticals. One explanation for this difference is the different standards applied by lower 
courts to these categories. Patents are – and are recognized to be – vital for pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries because of the high R&D costs, so they are also more often perceived 
to be genuinely in need of injunctive relief.245 Medical devices are in this respect closer to 
SEPs.246 
Also the relationship of the companies involved is a statistically significant factor. Injunctions 
are likely to be issued in disputes between competitors (84 % grant rate) and less likely if the 
companies are not in direct competition (21 %).247 In typical pharmaceutical cases the parties 
would be competitors (i.e., originator and generic company) and this probably also contributes 
to the high injunction grant rate of pharmaceuticals. However, for medical devices the grant rate 
is low also between competitors precisely due to public health interests, like in the case of 
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care.248 
Licensing activities of the patentee may also affect whether an injunction is granted, although 
studies show that even if the patent had been licensed to others, injunctions were issued in most 
cases.249 In a classical pharmaceutical setting the patent would not have been licensed to others, 
but used exclusively by the patentee. This generally speaks for the grant of injunctions. Also 
when the patent only covers a small component of the end product it is unlikely that an 
injunction is deemed appropriate.250 Traditional blockbuster medicine patents cover basically 
the entire product, so the small component objection would typically not apply. Also whether 
the infringement was willful has been raised as a factor speaking for the grant of an injunction, 
but there is no empirical evidence of this having an effect on the outcome.251 
According to this statistical analysis, pharmaceutical patents still enjoy a strong position in the 
US injunction market. In the following section, the interpretation of the eBay criteria in medical 
context will be discussed in more detail. Special consideration will be given to the requirements 
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of irreparable harm and not disserving the public interest.252 Later on, these interpretations will 
be analyzed from the European perspective. 
4.4.2 Application of eBay Criteria on Pharmaceutical Patents 
4.4.2.1 Irreparable Harm and Interests of the Patentee 
The eBay criteria require that irreparable harm has occurred to the patentee. This criterion has 
been held problematic from the perspective of the owner of a pharmaceutical patent. This is 
because patent infringements generally result in economic harm, but such harm can rarely be 
considered irreparable.253 Thus, a very strict interpretation of this criterion does not support an 
exclusivity-based business model or a strong right to exclude. Pharmaceutical patent 
infringements regularly result in loss of goodwill and pricing power. These are hard to estimate 
in monetary terms, so these features might not be adequately compensated, if an injunction were 
denied.254 On this basis, it has been recommended that the evaluation of irreparable harm should 
more concretely focus on the loss of exclusivity and harm resulting from that instead of factual 
monetary losses.255  
In practice, US courts seem to interpret this criterion in a rather broad manner that does not 
discriminate against pharmaceutical companies. The types of irreparable harm that have been 
accepted by US district courts include loss of market share, loss of goodwill, loss of business 
opportunities, price erosion and inability of infringer to pay monetary damages, the most 
common by far being the loss of market share.256 In the scenario where a generic pharmaceutical 
has entered the market, the types of harm applicable would typically include at least loss of 
market share and price erosion.257 Since the occurrence of these incidents at market entry of 
generics is a truth universally acknowledged, an innovative pharmaceutical company would 
usually fulfil the irreparable harm criterion.  
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Also speaking for irreparable harm is the fact that the future innovation activity of the 
pharmaceutical company depends on its ability to recoup its investments with its successful 
products. If the cash flow is disrupted, it could have long-term effects on the company's 
viability.258 The absence of other adequate remedies also overlaps significantly with the harm 
criterion and there is a huge correlation in the conclusions concerning these two criteria in US 
court interpretations.259  
There have been cases in the US where the grant of an injunction for a pharmaceutical company 
has been assessed on the eBay criteria. As could be assumed, irreparable harm has been 
established based especially on loss of market share, price erosion and loss of goodwill. Courts 
have also recognized the threat that infringement will continue and cause even more large and 
unquantifiable harm, if no injunction is issued. In pharmaceutical cases injunctions have been 
granted, when the patentee has successfully delivered these arguments of irreparable harm and 
insufficiency of monetary compensation.260 As seen above, the grant rate has remained high. 
It can still be concerning for companies that an injunction could be denied if the patentee for 
some reason fails to substantiate these claims. There has been at least one case,261 where the 
district court denied injunction on the basis that evidence on prospective irreparable harm was 
inadequate. It argued that all past harms could be compensated by damages, and only 
prospective harms could support the claim for injunction.262 In the said case, the Federal Circuit 
ended up criticizing this approach and stating that eBay does not mean that there would be "a 
presumption against exclusivity on successful infringement litigation".263 The right to exclude 
still exists, but there is also equitable discretion. In their exercise of the discretion, courts should 
take into account the exclusivity-related losses that have resulted from the infringement.264 
What also speaks for finding of irreparable harm is the holding of exclusive market before 
infringement took place. In such a setting it is easier to show that the growing sales of the 
infringer have happened directly to the detriment of the patentee. On the other hand, if the patent 
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has been licensed it can be hard to show that there would be irreparable harm that could not be 
compensated by damages.265 Such a comment was also made in the Johnson & Johnson Vision 
Care case,266 where licenses had been offered to competitors. This was in contradiction with a 
very strong interest in exercising the right to exclude. Still, it has not been ruled out that the 
emergence of a new infringing market player could cause irreparable harm even when there 
already are multiple companies offering the same product.267 
Overall, it must be concluded that the irreparable harm criterion generally supports the 
injunction claims of pharmaceutical companies. It seems to quite smoothly allow the courts to 
consider the interests of the patentee. However, there remains some insecurity that contributes 
to the general inconvenience of the test for patentees – after all, the other eBay criteria might 
not be fulfilled. That an injunction must "not disserve public interest" is a particularly interesting 
test from the perspective of health rights. It will be analyzed next. 
4.4.2.2 Not Disserving Public Interest 
The eBay criteria only require that the injunction is not contrary to public interest – not that it 
would necessarily promote public interest.268 In the context of pharmaceuticals it should be 
noted that the public interest of benefiting from access to lower priced medicines cannot as such 
be held to override the public interest of encouraging investments in risky pharmaceutical 
development.269 There can also be a public interest into the numerous jobs provided by the 
patentee, so the criterion does not only work in favor of the infringer.270  
The public interest criterion of eBay seems to have a lot of weight over whether an injunction is 
deemed appropriate in practice, and it might even be decisive.271 At the time when eBay was 
issued, patent owners worried that compulsory licenses would be issued to any competitor that 
mentioned this argument.272 During the first decade post-eBay, US district courts have addressed 
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public interest in permanent injunction cases at least fifteen times.273 In these cases, public 
interest has been quite narrowly interpreted to mean concerns related to public health, public 
welfare and public safety.274 In practice it seems that discretion is regularly exercised only in 
matters that involve "sickness, injury or medicine", and this tendency is self-feeding because of 
precedent mechanisms.275 It has even been suggested that it would be a successful litigation 
strategy for avoiding injunctions to tie the product – even loosely – to protection of health. 
Health-related claims of public interest seem to merit more attention and sympathy than others 
in US district court practice.276 
As to the substantial criteria for refusal of injunction – i.e., situations when the public interest 
prevails – it is possible to identify at least one case type. That is a situation where the injunction 
would make a socially valuable product completely unavailable.277 This could be the case when 
there are no lawful versions of the infringing product available, e.g. when the patentee does not 
manufacture a similar product. This is not the typical way we perceive pharmaceutical patent 
infringement – rather the products tend to be entirely substitutable. Sometimes it is possible that 
the infringer's product is slightly different in ways that make it safer or otherwise better suitable 
for some patients or applications.278 In these situations public interest might support denial of 
an injunction.  
For example in the Johnson & Johnson Vision Care279 case, an injunction was denied based on 
public health interests. The underlining interest was the interest of contact lens users to continue 
using their preferred type of lenses that allegedly possessed specific medical advantages. 
Another argument was that doctors should be free to determine which type of vision correction 
method best suited each patient. The court found these arguments persuasive and put emphasis 
on the prospect of "innocent" contact lens users facing confusion and additional costs as well as 
on concerns regarding the availability of proper vision care. Some scholars have expressed 
surprise for the outcome taking into account the lack of scientific evidence and the multiplicity 
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of alternatives for affected users. According to them, the case manifests an expansion of the 
concept of public interest in district court practice.280  
Although the case was not about pharmaceuticals, it exhibits the core arguments that can be 
made in favor of denying injunctions based on health. A curious aspect is the meaning of the 
inconvenience of users, when there are no vital interests involved. According to Riley and Allen, 
"when technology becomes so fundamental to everyday existence, the public necessity for any 
one particular invention may start to mimic the traits of life-saving technology"281. If this is true, 
then the "popularity" of a product could play a major role in determining whether an injunction 
is appropriate from the point of view of public interest.282  
Such features can be observed in the reasoning of Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, because the 
large number of users and doctors preferring the infringing product seemed to weigh a lot in the 
court's reasoning. There have also been unofficial court opinions suggesting that the existence 
of options is as such a public interest and an infringing product need not demonstrate specific 
advantages to avoid injunction.283 This was the conclusion of the District Court in the case 
Amgen v. Sanofi.284 
Yet, if there are alternatives available, the fact that patients need to change to a non-infringing 
product cannot significantly disserve the public interest. This has been the holding in many 
medical devices cases.285 The argument is also supported by the Federal Circuit's judgment in 
Amgen v. Sanofi.286 The Federal Circuit stated that the District Court had erred in its analysis of 
the public interest factor when granting an injunction for a pharmaceutical patent. The District 
Court had concluded that public interest would be disserved, because the injunction would take 
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a helpful drug off the market. The Federal Circuit noted that with this logic pharmaceuticals 
would never merit an injunction, because it would always reduce the available options for 
patients. It stated that the "infringer cannot escape an injunction merely by producing infringing 
drugs" and the public interest of having multiple suppliers of a drug is not appropriate for 
denying an injunction.  
Overall, eBay has not had a significant effect on the availability of injunctions on the life science 
sector. Injunctions are still frequently granted, but the patentee must put more effort in giving 
reasons why the grant is justified. In the most typical cases of an infringing generic product, it 
is fairly easy to substantiate irreparable harm and inadequacy of other remedies. It is the public 
interest factor that might sometimes override the patentee's right to exclude. As seen in the above 
examples, these cases are relatively limited and more likely to occur in the context of medical 
devices than pharmaceuticals. Yet, it cannot be ruled out that such arguments would also be 
successful in a traditional pharmaceutical litigation.287 Especially the prospect of a 
pharmaceutical becoming unavailable due to an injunction would seem to disserve the public 
interest. From these perspectives we move to consider Europe. 
4.5  Will the EU Adopt Discretion? 
4.5.1 Basis for Exercise of Discretion in Europe 
4.5.1.1 Interpretation of the Enforcement Directive 
The analysis in section 4.2 showed that the Enforcement Directive does not impose any 
requirement of equitable discretion nor have European countries otherwise implemented such a 
provision. Thus, a similar kind of shift as in eBay seems at first highly unlikely to occur in 
Europe. After all, the eBay interpretation was based on the discretion explicitly imposed in the 
Patent Act. However, the strengthening of human rights concerns and the existence of Article 3 
should make it possible to adopt a more discretionary approach at least in cases where human 
rights are involved.  
The UK provides an example of how discretion might be exercised within the framework of the 
Enforcement Directive – with the reservation that there injunctions are subject to equitable 
discretion like in the USA. In the UK common law system, injunction is an equitable remedy, 
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meaning that by default the court should exercise discretion in awarding it.288 In practice, the 
case law has substantially limited this discretion and established that injunctions should be 
granted if a valid right has been infringed.289  
Despite this main rule, Article 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive has been directly referenced 
in UK courts and proportionality has been considered.290 In HTC v. Nokia it was stated that the 
exercise of discretion in granting injunctions is subject to the conditions of Article 3(2), 
including proportionality and dissuasiveness.291 Recently the Supreme Court touched upon the 
issue in a case292 stating essentially that the standard test (called Shelfer criteria) for awarding 
remedies was outdated and the lower courts should be more flexible in deciding between 
injunctions and monetary damages.293 For now, it is still the infringer who must show that the 
injunction would be grossly disproportionate. Although the UK is more discretionary than the 
European average, there is a significant difference to the US practice, where it is the patentee 
that must show entitlement to an injunction.294 If these recent developments continue, the UK 
might be tempted to look at the USA for guidance on how to implement a discretionary 
framework. 
The CJEU's Huawei295 decision does not apply the Enforcement Directive, although it refers to 
it. The case could have contained more discussion on the Article 3 requirements (fairness and 
proportionality), since the case was about which remedies should be available for use in the 
specific context of FRAND license negotiations.296 That being said, the case was specifically 
about FRAND negotiation duties, so it does not help much in evaluating discretion of the court 
or the content of public interest generally.297  It does not really address granting injunctions. It 
is still frequently cited in this context because it combines a competition law approach to patent 
enforcement practices, where the use of injunctions is very relevant. Competition law is also 
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meant to promote public interest, although it employs a completely different toolset than those 
of patent law or human rights.298 However, it is generally not deemed suitable for delicate 
balancing decisions because of its roughness.299 Huawei does not in any way correspond to eBay 
type discretion, which is much wider and more general.300 The situation could change if the 
CJEU were faced with another preliminary question that would specifically be about injunctions 
and balancing them with public interests.  
4.5.1.2 Preliminary Question to the CJEU 
The CJEU's approach to balancing the property and liability rules has experienced some shifts 
in the past decades. Based on its early practice, the court could be accused of purpose-oriented 
interpretations, since it readily referred to the TRIPS Agreement and WIPO treaties to 
strengthen trade-related rights, but left out references to e.g. the ICESCR.301 Even when the case 
at hand was ultimately about a conflict of fundamental rights, the CJEU did not engage in 
extensive discussion of balancing, but simply stated that limitations are justified for the 
protection of IP.302 This approach was essentially about protecting the EU legislator's 
intentions.303  
Since then the CJEU has adopted a more active role in promoting approximation of IP laws and 
their interpretation in harmony with human rights. This development has been most prevalent 
in copyright, because despite extensive EU regulation of the topic there are still significant 
disparities in the national frameworks.304 The CJEU has turned to emphasize the existence of a 
fair balance between conflicting interests,305 although the use of human rights argumentation 
has remained quite selective.306 The Court could easily put more emphasis on other human rights 
and thus shift the fair balance towards wider interpretation of exceptions.307  
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Because enforcement measures are harmonized in the EU, the CJEU could be confronted with 
a question about the availability of injunctions.308 The CJEU probably would raise up relevant 
human rights concerns, but it must be assumed that its starting point would be wide patent rights 
including a strong right to exclude.  It might take the easy way and simply rely as a main rule 
on the enforceability of valid IP rights.  
Proportionality might arise more concretely if there were an important public interest supporting 
the denial of injunction. The CJEU could say, relying on the CFR and possibly also the ECHR 
and ICESCR, that a fair balance must be struck between protection of the patentee's property 
and the public's right to health and this might sometimes mean that injunction should not be 
granted. It would seem weird that the arbitrary exercise of exclusion could override central 
human rights interests, especially since there is the possibility to rely on the liability rule and 
monetary compensation. The CJEU probably would confirm the relativity of the patentee's right 
to exclude like it has confirmed that the protection of IP under the CFR is not absolute. 
This prediction is supported by the notion that the CJEU would have to take into account the 
founding treaties. Article 168 TFEU requires that a high level of human health protection is 
ensured in all EU policies. Since patent enforcement has been harmonized, the availability of 
injunctions is an EU policy subject to the interpretations of the CJEU. If the CJEU were to state 
that injunction must be granted in all infringement cases,309 it would not be ensuring a high level 
of human health protection in this particular policy. Hence, it must be concluded that the CJEU 
could (or at least should) not rule out the possibility of health interests preventing the grant of 
injunctive relief. This would be consistent with the "balanced interpretation" of the Enforcement 
Directive as described by Norrgård.310 This means that the interpretation should not be 
mechanical, but the context of individual cases as well as human rights should be taken into 
account. In practice this interpretation corresponds to the discretionary approach. 
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At this point it can be concluded that the current European system provides adequate tools for 
the exercise of discretion, even though injunctions (especially for pharmaceutical patents) are 
still issued as a matter of course in national court practice. The realization of health rights could 
be used as a discretionary limitation in the grant of permanent injunctions for pharmaceutical 
patents in the EU by applying human rights law and Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive. 
However, this is unlikely to become a practice unless a revolutionary case emerges – one that 
would change the established practice eBay-like.311 The CJEU could potentially make a turn 
like that if it were presented with appropriate preliminary questions. Still, this must not be taken 
for granted, because sometimes the CJEU has been quite reluctant to give clear guidance on 
hard cases.312 Also cases of some prestigious national Supreme Courts could have an effect on 
the European level, although they would not bind other Member States. It seems, though, that 
such a decision would involve interpretation of the Enforcement Directive to an extent that 
would require referral of a question to the CJEU. The forthcoming Unitary Patent System also 
provides some interesting options, as will be discussed next. 
4.5.2 Unitary Patent System – Limited Discretion? 
4.5.2.1 UPC's Discretion in Granting Injunctions 
The Unitary Patent System has been making its way into reality for several years now. There 
have been a couple of setbacks in the ratification phase, but on paper the system is ready. It has 
been created through enhanced cooperation blessed by EU Regulations. The major document 
that sets up the Unified Patent Court (UPC) – the UPC Agreement (UPCA) – is an international 
treaty open for EU Member States. It is thus institutionally independent, but nevertheless 
reserves a special role for the CJEU in the interpretation of EU law (Article 21 UPCA). 
The UPC will also start from the patentee's right to exclude others (Article 25 UPCA). Article 
63 UPCA deals with permanent injunctions stating that the UPC "may grant an injunction". The 
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formulation of this provision does not give much information given the interpretation practice 
of similar provisions. However, as a main rule the word "may" is used in legal provisions, when 
options are involved and the word "shall" is used, when there is no room for discretion of the 
court.313 This would imply some sort of discretion for the UPC. 
What makes the situation somewhat more complicated is the formulation of the provisions 
concerning preliminary injunctions and monetary damages (Articles 62 and 68, respectively). 
In case of preliminary injunctions, Article 62(2) UPCA specifically states that the UPC "shall 
have the discretion to weigh up the interests of the parties and in particular to take into account 
the potential harm for either of the parties resulting from the granting or the refusal of the 
injunction". The lack of a similar statement in Article 63 implies that there is significantly less 
discretion in terms of granting permanent injunctions. On the other hand, Article 68 provides 
that the UPC "shall -- order the infringer -- to pay the injured party damages". Similar language 
is used in terms of determining patent validity. This wording suggests that there is no discretion 
in terms of awarding damages, but they follow automatically from an established 
infringement.314  
Thus, the wording "may" in Article 63 suggests that the UPC is provided with some discretion 
in terms of permanent injunctions – although not as wide as with preliminary injunctions.315 The 
preparatory committee of the UPC Rules of Procedure (ROP) specifically rejected the need to 
add the expressly discretionary sentence of Article 62(2) UPCA to the ROP provision 
concerning permanent injunctions. This decision was recommended on the basis that Article 63 
UPCA already grants the court discretion by using the word "may". General guidelines for using 
such discretion would follow from Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive.316 This would seem 
to be in line with the literal interpretation that implies that the grant of injunctions would be the 
main rule, although not entirely automatic. 
The other course of interpretation would be that the UPCA provision merely restates what the 
Enforcement Directive and TRIPS Agreement already require, and there would not necessarily 
be significant discretion. Established principles of Member States and the lack of discussion 
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about these questions in the UPCA drafting phase speak for this interpretation.317 Partly in 
support of this view, the Legal Group of the Preparatory Committee has stated that "where the 
Court finds an infringement of a patent it will under Article 63 of the Agreement give order of 
injunctive relief. Only under very exceptional circumstances it will use its discretion and not 
give such an order."318 This presents injunctions clearly as the main rule. This statement is also 
not in contradiction with the above interpretation of discretion that should only be exercised in 
limited circumstances. The Preparatory Committee has stated that "Article 63 of the Agreement 
provides for a general discretion to grant a final injunction",319 which further supports the view 
that the UPC might intentionally be well equipped to balance the right to exclude with other 
relevant interests. 
It is also clear that no eBay-like criteria were meant to be put in place and such interpretation 
would be quite far-fetched.320 Introduction of eBay criteria into the ROP was suggested in public 
consultation, but this suggestion was rejected by the Preparatory Committee.321 Thus, it seems 
that the UPC would not be intended to exercise general discretion in all cases. Rather, it would 
be authorized to evaluate the proportionality and appropriateness of remedies and possibly deny 
an injunction in individual circumstances. The right to exclude would remain the main rule, but 
the UPC would be equipped to keep an eye on how public interests are affected by its judgments.  
4.5.2.2 Factors Affecting Exercise of Discretion in the UPC 
There are several factors worth mentioning in the context of UPC's discretion in granting 
injunctions. First there is the question of whether the closer rules regarding discretion should be 
drawn (exclusively) from Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive. Some would like to conclude 
that there would be no way for direct application of the Article 3(2) proportionality requirement 
in the UPC.322 This would be because proportionality is not the only requirement in the 
provision: it also requires that remedies be effective and dissuasive and not create barriers to 
legitimate trade. The requirements of effectiveness and dissuasiveness seem to pull the balance 
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into opposite direction from proportionality.323 This of course applies equally to interpretations 
of the CJEU and national courts and is one of the main obstacles in concluding that the right to 
exclude was meant to be more relative and subject to balancing. It is possible to read Article 3 
as mere description of the provided measures instead of a restriction upon them.  
Moreover, the existence of discretion does not guarantee that the UPC would be willing to 
engage in extensive analysis of human rights. A specialized patent court might be both reluctant 
and incompetent to make such decisions. It might be recommended that the statutory rules 
should be more unequivocal as to which factors should be taken into account in the balancing. 
Then again, many stakeholders have expressed that it would be highly undesirable to create a 
statutory discretion system. Instead the possible power to exercise discretion should be left for 
the UPC to interpret and establish.324 This would be consistent with the UPCA, although 
somewhat in tension with current continental practice.325 Luckily, the UPC will be an entirely 
new and independent forum that is not formally bound by national interpretations of the past.  
Despite this seemingly clean slate, it has been speculated that the backgrounds of the judges that 
deal with the first major UPC cases would have a big effect on what the UPC's case law will 
look like.326 In discussions with judges about the UPC, it turned out that most judges thought 
that discretion in granting injunctions existed and proportionality should be considered 
according to Article 3 Enforcement Directive.327 Thus, the first wave of cases hitting the Court 
might leave a permanent mark on its practice depending on what type of cases those are. If the 
first years of the UPC go without any cases where the application of discretion would be 
appropriate, the Court might become more unwilling to exercise it even in cases where it would 
be justified. It seems that much depends on who will decide which cases in the early days of the 
new tribunal. 
A weakness of the UPC from the realization of health rights perspective is its strong reliance on 
expert judges. Unlike the Federal Circuit in the USA, the UPC judges will not be exposed to 
other than patent cases. This puts them in danger of becoming biased and only able to take into 
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account concerns stemming from within the patent system. Other EU values like human rights 
– including public health – might be left in the shadow. Especially the non-lawyer experts might 
be incompetent in addressing non-IP related legal arguments and concerns. Taking into account 
this isolation, it can be held particularly questionable that interference by the CJEU has been 
made so marginal.328 As a conclusion, it seems that the application of discretion in the UPC is 
full of uncertainties that will only begin to resolve once the court starts to operate. 
4.5.3 Prospects for Pharmaceutical Patents 
4.5.3.1 Pharmaceutical Patents in the Unitary Patent System 
The UPC system is of interest especially for innovative pharmaceutical companies, because they 
regularly seek protection in the entire EU.329 On the other hand, the system might seem tempting 
for generic companies to try and centrally revoke an important patent.330 As a limitation, the 
UPC does not have jurisdiction over nationally granted patents, but only those granted centrally 
by the EPO.331 Moreover, patentees have the right to opt out from the jurisdiction of the UPC 
(Article 83(3) UPCA).  
This possibility to opt out was promoted especially by the pharmaceutical industry, which has 
been skeptical about the UPC.332 The system seems dangerous, because the upcoming practice 
of the UPC is not known. Innovative pharmaceutical companies are not willing to risk their most 
valuable assets being invalidated by a single judgment of the UPC.333 They are expected to use 
the opt-out option to protect their most important patents from central attack until they can be 
sure that they receive beneficial treatment in the UPC.334  
This is interesting from the point of view of general popularity of the UPC, because 
pharmaceutical companies represent one of the few industries that would clearly find savings in 
having one unitary patent instead of a bunch of national patents.335 Additionally, they already 
engage in multi-jurisdictional patent litigation, so they were initially seen as a promising target 
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group of the new system.336 Reactions of the originator companies are an important factor in 
determining the actual volume of UPC patent litigation.337 
Opting out of the UPC's jurisdiction would be a purely defensive act. Moreover, it is not final: 
a patent can be re-entered into the Unitary Patent System as long as no national proceedings 
have been started.338 This is also important, because the innovator companies are frequent 
litigators. A bit over half of European pharmaceutical litigation starts as an infringement action 
from the patentee.339 This tells us that the companies also seek effective enforcement in addition 
to shelter from centralized revocation.340 A pan-European injunction would be a valuable tool 
in keeping out infringing products, so pharmaceutical companies are likely to carefully keep an 
eye on the UPC independent of possible initial opt-out.  
If the UPC turns out to exercise wide discretion in granting injunctions and the national practices 
do not change, innovator companies would most likely prefer to litigate in national courts that 
would not put too much emphasis on public health concerns. Of course, this situation might 
change by a preliminary ruling of the CJEU – which could theoretically originate either from a 
national court or from the UPC. Correspondingly, very automatic injunctions would encourage 
to move patent litigation from national courts to the UPC for the sake of efficiency.  
Here lies also a dilemma: will the UPC be tempted to lure in more cases by adjusting its 
argumentation to be favorable for e.g. innovative pharma so that they would bring in more 
cases?341 Or will national courts do so? Especially in its early days, the UPC will merely be one 
more alternative tribunal in Europe and parties will weigh carefully the potential risks and 
benefits of litigating there.342 Depending on how secured the position of the UPC becomes and 
how many cases flow in there naturally, there might be no need for flattery. However, as an 
alternative court, there is a high risk that it will experience some form of pressure to make itself 
an attractive venue in the eyes of "clients". Then again, the UPC is equipped to be better than 
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national courts in other aspects such as speed and specialization, so it might attract patentees 
also without purpose-oriented interpretations.343 
4.5.3.2 Application of eBay Reasoning to European Pharmaceuticals 
Alongside with the above prospects relating to the UPC, it needs to be considered how the 
discretionary approach could be applied to pharmaceuticals in European courts – be it a national 
court, the UPC or the CJEU. In this section, the arguments of US eBay case law will be tested 
for suitability in the discretion framework of the EU. As will be seen, most of the US arguments 
fit quite well into the legal framework of the EU, although some things have traditionally 
received differential emphasis. 
As discussed above, irreparable harm (and inadequacy of other remedies) often speak for the 
grant of an injunction in pharmaceutical patent cases. The irreparable harm factor has been 
addressed in Europe mostly in the context of preliminary injunctions. Pharmaceutical patents 
have been quite strong in these cases.344 Just like in the application of the eBay criteria, it is 
relatively simple for pharmaceutical companies to show irreparable harm in case a generic 
product is launched. The existence of such harm seems to tip the scale of proportionality, 
effectiveness and dissuasiveness towards injunctions. Hence, it is reasonable to stay the 
assumption that issuing an injunction would remain the main rule in Europe even in case 
discretion exists. Injunction would usually be proportional for the protection of a valid IPR. 
Only in special circumstances would other interests receive serious consideration.  
As for the public interest, we can start from the presumption that "serving" public interest would 
not be explicitly required in the EU, either, although sometimes injunctions undoubtedly do 
so.345 However, disserving it might make an injunction disproportionate. Under eBay, making a 
medically important product unavailable to patients has been deemed to disserve the public 
interest and to justify not issuing an injunction.346 This might also work as a basis for denial in 
Europe. In pharmaceutical patent contexts this might occur if the infringing generic product is 
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slightly different from the original in ways that make it more suitable to some patients.347 If the 
(potential) unavailability of a specific pharmaceutical were a result of more or less arbitrary 
exercise of the right to exclude, a conflict between health rights and property rights might be 
recognized and addressed according to the described principles. Of course, application of this 
reasoning usually requires that the infringing product already is on the market and is used by 
patients. Otherwise it would be much harder to show that patients would have a health rights 
based interest in keeping the infringing product available. 
Especially before the eBay ruling, the priority of limited term exclusive rights was recognized 
as a conscious choice of the lawmaker in the USA. At that time, many public interest arguments 
against injunctions could be overturned by competing public interests related to the patentee: 
denial of an injunction would distort the patentee's economy, which might lead to loss of jobs 
and investments. The argument was that this would disserve the public interest more than the 
short period when there was no free competition on the specific product.348  
This is a relevant argument that might have some room also in European cases. The functioning 
of the market – undoubtedly the EU's favorite argument349 – might be deemed to require clear 
and enforceable rights. In the traditional sense, dysfunction of the market would obviously 
disserve the public interest and such dysfunction might be caused if viable businesses are 
exposed to unnecessary insecurity – even if such insecurity would promote competition. This 
argument can be overcome by emphasizing the meaning of timely access to medicine and the 
initial idea to balance IPRs with other relative interests instead of treating the statutory rights as 
absolute. 
This chapter can be concluded by stating that judicial interpretation definitely makes it possible 
to introduce discretion into grant of injunctions in the EU. There are many ways and forums 
how and where such discretion could be framed. No single way can immediately be identified 
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as the best one. A preliminary ruling of the CJEU seems the smoothest and most effective way, 
but there are no guarantees that such case would ever be presented to the CJEU, so other options 
must be left open. For pharmaceutical business a discretionary system would cause more 
uncertainty, but it would not necessarily mean weakening the right to exclude in standard cases. 
There are many factors affecting the final balance of each case. Those factors will be analyzed 
more thoroughly in the next chapter, which will discuss the balance between issuing injunctions 
and emphasizing health rights. 
5.  Introducing Health Right Considerations into Patent Law 
5.1 How to Balance 
In this chapter I will consider how the discretion could be applied in practice and where the 
balance should be struck. Special focus will be on the question when it would be appropriate to 
deny injunctive relief. Different aspects will be considered. The viewpoint of this chapter will 
bring in more human rights rhetoric after the patent law focused approach of chapter 4. In 
chapter 4 it was concluded that the basis for discretion exists in the EU, too, but it has not been 
brought to legal practice. It has also been established that the exercise of discretion requires 
proper balancing of the interests of the patentee and those of the public. The aim of this chapter 
is to find some practical guidelines for establishing that balance.  
One interesting aspect of the quest is whether a patentee should have done something "wrong" 
to be "deprived" of the right to exclude. Or should grounds for denial of injunction be 
independent of the patentee's conduct? One such wrongdoing could be that a pharmaceutical 
company would be in breach of an obligation to comply with human rights. Another reason 
could be that public health considerations require it independent of what the patentee does. The 
meaning of the conduct of the patentee is the underlying theme of this chapter.  
Another theme that is raised in this final chapter is the value-based choices that must be made 
in striking the balance. So far the values have not been directly addressed, although they have 
been present in the weighing discussion. Here they will be discussed along with the different 
approaches identified to make conclusions about possible courses of action. 
As concluded in the above analysis, European laws give courts discretion in granting injunctions 
– or at least they do not rule it out. It remains somewhat cloudy how this theoretical discretion 
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could be put to use and whether it should be done in any typical cases. Courts have the authority 
to take into account human rights considerations, since they are part of the applicable law. When 
the applicable patent law does not include an absolute obligation to grant an injunction,350 it 
seems that EU courts could well discuss the public interest implications of an injunction request. 
One scenario that might trigger the start of a new practice is an extreme case, where human 
rights interests would be so manifestly compromised that the court simply could not prioritize 
the patentee's rights. Such a case could also affect the argumentation of cases where the 
imbalance of interests is less extreme. 
5.2 Corporate Human Rights Compliance 
5.2.1 Do Pharmaceutical Companies Have Human Rights Responsibilities? 
The question discussed in this section is whether there are or could be any human rights 
responsibilities for pharmaceutical companies and how these might be enforced. The idea is that 
if a company could be held to be in breach of its human rights obligations, it would not be 
granted an injunction. The threat of not being able to enforce a patent would then force 
companies to pay more attention to the human rights implications of their products, in practice 
to value appropriately the interests of patients in having access to the patented pharmaceuticals. 
Availability of injunctions could thus be used to encourage desired conduct – if corporations 
have human rights obligations. 
Currently only states must comply with international human rights obligations. Multinational 
corporations are not legally bound by human rights obligations, although one can argue that they 
are morally obligated to respect human rights. Such moral obligation can only be supervised 
and enforced by soft law mechanisms, like different guidelines.351 There are no direct 
mechanisms how human rights could be enforced on private companies.352 Yet, the borderline 
between states and private entities has clouded in recent decades as states have transferred their 
duties to private companies and big corporations have gained a lot of power.353 It can be argued 
that an individual is as vulnerable before a huge corporation as it is before a state entity, and for 
                                                          
350 Such an absolute obligation would imply that an appropriate balance has already been struck by the lawmaker. 
Usually this is not the case, as discussed above. 
351 den Exter 2010 p. 135–136. 
352 Ahmadiani & Nikfar 2016 p. 6. 
353 Hestermeyer 2007 p. 95. 
66 
 
this reason some of the human rights obligations of states should extend to such corporations.354 
In principle the WTO is also not bound by human rights, except those of jus cogens. This has 
been criticized a lot.355 
According to the interpretation of the CESCR, all members of society, including private 
businesses like pharmaceutical companies, "have responsibilities regarding the realization of 
the right to health".356 Unfortunately it has not specified what these responsibilities are 
exactly.357 Many officials have recognized that the "pharmaceutical sector has an indispensable 
role to play in relation to the right to health and access to medicines" and specific pharmaceutical 
companies have very constructively contributed by their access programs and by participating 
in initiatives.358 Many scholars also stress that there is a strong need for enhanced corporate 
responsibility in the pharmaceutical world in terms of access to medicines.359 
Strict interpretation of these statements would require that the pharmaceutical industry pay more 
attention to social responsibility instead of just enhancing shareholder value.360 However, it is 
recognized that such requirements are disproportionate without any specific guidelines on 
desired practices.361 The UN pharmaceutical guidelines362 would prohibit inter alia lobbying for 
extended patent protection and refusal to license pharmaceutical patents. Compliance with these 
requirements would mean very fundamental changes in business strategy to many innovative 
pharmaceutical companies.363 This is not possible without detailed guidance on what is 
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expected.364 Abstract responsibilities tend to not lead to very efficient outcomes, especially since 
the company management is also responsible to comply with the business judgment rule.365  
According to some views, corporate human rights responsibilities would basically obligate 
pharmaceutical companies to make all novel medicines as accessible as possible in terms of 
price, availability and timing.366 Under this obligation, a company should even amend its 
patenting practices if they contravene health rights.367 This is a problematic statement, since it 
does not address the role of financial sustainability in pharmaceutical business. Especially while 
health rights promotion measures are mere voluntary suggestions, company management cannot 
put into practice extensive schemes that are contrary to established practice and business 
interests. Even when admitting that companies are allowed to make "a reasonable profit",368 
many questions remain. Who decides how much profit is too much? Are all R&D costs taken 
into account? Does this actually differ in any way from a general abuse of rights prohibition? If 
the only material effect of these rules would be that the pricing of pharmaceuticals is not allowed 
to be extravagant, one could argue that there already are mechanisms that make sure it is not.369 
In the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights it is stated that "business 
enterprises should respect human rights".370 This "respect" can be held as the baseline of what 
is required.371 The Principles further explain that to fulfil the responsibility to respect companies 
should have in place a human rights policy, exercise human rights due diligence and be ready 
to remedy any adverse human rights impacts they cause.372 According to the Institute for Human 
Rights and Business, companies operating in areas that closely affect the realization of certain 
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rights – such as the right to health in the case of pharmaceutical companies – should have more 
responsibilities than the basic respect obligation.373 Overall, it seems that no concrete 
obligations exist, but the consensus seems to be that some form of human rights consideration 
can be required of the pharmaceutical industry. There is no unanimity on the extent of this 
consideration. 
5.2.2 How to Enforce Human Rights Compliance 
If there are some human rights obligations for pharmaceutical companies, they cannot be 
directly enforced at the moment. However, they can be incentivized. There are constructs that 
would tie human rights compliance with some concrete outcomes to the company i.e., 
noncompliance would be indirectly punished. This could be framed in multiple ways, the most 
important of which will be discussed here briefly. 
Den Exter has proposed that granting patents should be subject to conditions of social 
responsibility.374 For pharmaceuticals this would mean ensuring access to medicines by 
appropriate pricing and voluntary licensing. Such a requirement would surely interfere with 
current industry practices, but could be justified from a human rights perspective.375 This 
approach resembles the general social contract or social license framework that can be used to 
describe the idea of patent rights.376 However, the realization of such requirement would require 
legislative changes and it could only be applied to future patents.377 
One issue that could be relatively easily incentivized is the development of medicines to 
neglected diseases. Based on mere business judgments the R&D activities of companies tend to 
focus on curing diseases typical for large amounts of western world patients that are able to pay 
for expensive treatments or insurances.378 These include long-term treatments for chronic 
diseases and cancer, whereas cures for acute or very rare diseases are not as tempting 
commercially.379 This issue of neglected diseases has resulted in calls for corporate human rights 
                                                          
373 IHRB 2009 p. 5. 
374 den Exter 2010 p. 136–137. These conditions might mean that a patent could be revoked or not enforced if it 
were "misused". 
375 Ibid. 
376 Lee & Hunt 2012 p. 227–228. 
377 It might not require amendments to TRIPS, if it could be framed to fall within the public health exception. This 
makes it a much more appealing solution, although still very theoretical. 
378 Helfer 2015 p. 14. 
379 Ahmadiani & Nikfar 2016 p. 3. 
69 
 
compliance requirements and regulatory incentives.380 Companies could be required to take part 
in R&D concerning neglected diseases, either directly or by funding such activities.381 However, 
this is not exactly an issue of patent law, and it concerns primarily developing countries, 
although some rare diseases remain neglected also in the EU.  
Assuming there are corporate human rights responsibilities, it would seem convenient to control 
the availability of injunctions as an insurance of compliance. The WTO rules and TRIPS 
Agreement prevent any major interference with patent rights and their exercise, so wealthy 
states only have limited tools in enforcing or promoting health rights.382 Restricting the use of 
injunctions would not directly interfere with current IP treaties. It would seem odd if 
pharmaceutical companies were held accountable for very high standards of human rights 
compliance, but at the same time they could exclude infringers by obtaining injunctions without 
the human rights aspects being concerned in the infringement trial. In most cases this 
interpretation would not even change the legal state. As seen in the above analysis, it is hard to 
come up with patent law proof arguments why injunctions would not be justified in standard 
pharmaceutical cases. This is because the right to health does not prevail over property rights in 
a normal, non-urgent or non-vital situation. The interests of the patentee become the primary 
concern in such a setting.  
At the moment the easiest tool for limiting effects of counter-productive practices would seem 
to be competition law.383 It does not directly compromise the status of patent rights, but it could 
be employed more vigorously to prevent strategies that postpone market entry of generics post-
expiry. It might even be suitable for the realization of the principles suggested by den Exter, 
described above. This would basically be a policy change in how we want companies to act and 
what conduct we deem acceptable under the current values. Also NGO-originating "naming and 
shaming" and other penalizing practices are mentioned as tools to make human rights promotion 
profitable for pharmaceutical companies.384 
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Most radical voices have suggested that pharmaceutical companies should be required to sign 
human rights treaties so that they could officially be monitored and held accountable.385 This 
would mean a fundamental change in the human rights framework, if any legal person could be 
obligated with human rights. This appears as a rather bad idea that would distort some basic 
principles. After all, companies are dedicated to making money for their owners. Companies 
cannot be turned into charities by requiring that they actively promote human rights. They must 
base their decisions primarily on business perspectives and corporate benefit to stay viable. It 
should be for the states to set out the framework within which the pursuit of profit can happen 
and what conduct is allowed.386  
Overall, any serious introduction of corporate human rights compliance into the legal system 
would require substantial efforts from many different parties.387 Thus, it does not seem the 
primary option for some relatively minor interest balancing. Admittedly, the concerns of 
developing countries can be more serious, but in this case focus is on developed countries, where 
the basic level of health rights is generally quite well materialized. The availability of 
injunctions might provide appropriate balancing for the kind of extreme situations where 
interference is deemed necessary. 
From this analysis it can be concluded that there are many ways to incentivize companies to 
have more interest in public health concerns. It also seems that judicial interpretation – i.e., 
controlling the availability of injunctions – is not unsuitable for addressing the realization of 
health rights in the pharmaceutical patent context. If a company takes carefully into account 
patient interests and has ensured that health rights are realized as far as reasonable,388 it might 
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be hard for a court to deny injunctive relief based on health rights arguments. On the other hand, 
if the business strategy of the patentee neglects patient interests, it might be justified to not issue 
an injunction in order to allow better access for patients.  
This logic would be easy to apply, but it would require the recognition of some obligations of 
the companies. After all, the denial of injunction would be based on an alleged shortcoming of 
the company to consider health rights. As discussed, the existence of any such obligations is 
controversial. Besides, even if a company has done everything right, there might still be cases 
where an injunction would not be appropriate. These would be cases of compelling public health 
interests. Those will be considered next. 
5.3 Public Health as a Limitation to Patent Enforcement 
The goal of this section is to come up with public health related criteria that would justify denial 
of an injunction without any major malpractices from the patentee's side. Public interest 
arguments would be a clear way of introducing such rhetoric into patent enforcement. This is a 
central part of the more general discretion doctrines introduced above, such as the US eBay 
criteria or enforcement of SEPs. The fourth eBay factor specifically addresses public interest. 
This makes consideration of public interest aspects mandatory for all US courts dealing with 
patent disputes.389 Despite this step toward public interest considerations, it has remained 
somewhat unclear what the role of this factor is in practice.390 According to Riley and Allen, it 
remains somewhat underused and could be utilized more exploratively.391 This is all the more 
true for Europe, where no balancing doctrine is in place. 
The CJEU392 might be in a position to develop a public interest test that would apply under the 
framework of the Enforcement Directive. Considering health rights specifically, its content 
might be something like "an injunction should not be granted if it would compromise the health 
interests of a relevant patient population". In discussions with judges about the UPC, public 
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health was seen as a relevant factor in the balancing required in awarding remedies for health 
products. The views diverged on whether an injunction should be issued in the specific example 
given. Some judges would have considered a compulsory license, whereas some would have 
issued an injunction.393 This shows that there is indeed balancing and decision-making involved, 
so even an outspoken balancing rule could have differential applications. 
Among the issues debated by the judges were the significance of the affected patient population 
and the role of financial considerations. Some considered ten affected individuals per million to 
be a relevant population in terms of public health while others did not. It was also discussed 
whether the patentee's product being too expensive was a good enough reason not to grant an 
injunction.394 Many judges seemed to think that refusal to issue an injunction should never be 
based on financial factors unless abuse of a dominant position was at hand.395 This is consistent 
with the notion that mere patient interest in cheaper medicines is not important enough to 
override the right to exclude.396  
While this might be a good starting point, the situation becomes more complicated if it is shown 
that people become permanently disabled because they could not access a pharmaceutical or a 
diagnostic test because of its price. At this point it might be reasonable to draw out the arguments 
concerning the primacy of health rights over property. The closer the pharmaceutical at hand is 
to an essential medicine or life-saving technology the more justified it would be to lean on the 
non-derogable human right rhetoric without violating P1(1) and the right to exclude. The 
situation is trickier if the incomplete accessibility of pharmaceuticals is essentially a result of 
inadequate allocation of resources to national healthcare systems.397 Such a setting can hardly 
be blamed on the patentee, although they will be damaged by it if the primacy of health 
argumentation in deemed appropriate in the circumstances. The dilemma of matching the 
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patients' and the patentees' rights and the realities of national healthcare systems is likely to 
intensify as more expensive novel therapies make it to the market.398 
The above example highlights the meaning of factual circumstances. It is often hard to 
demonstrate that e.g. a national health system would not be able to afford a specific medicine.399 
The patentee tends to enjoy a type of benefit of doubt in the sense that its product is assumed to 
be accessible enough if there is nothing to compare it with. This is manifested in the US district 
court practice, where the public interest factor is unlikely to hinder an injunction if the infringing 
product has not yet made it to the market.400 In those cases it has not yet had the chance to 
become the trusted product for consumers – a fact that has sometimes been assimilated with 
public health interests.401 In such a case the injunction would not remove a product from 
consumers' grasp and interfere with acquired benefits, so it is easier to accept. From a patentee's 
perspective it would be crucial to act fast in the administrative launch phases of the infringing 
pharmaceutical so that the possible benefits of the infringing product will never materialize for 
patients. In such a way, also the public interest stays hypothetical and thus cannot be disserved 
with an injunction. 
There seems to be no reason why similar logic could not be applied in a European setting. It 
would indeed seem contrary to property rights for a court to choose to allow an infringement to 
happen in the future (when the product is not yet marketed) without any knowledge of whether 
it will facilitate better access for anyone. An acquired benefit setting is different, because it 
would require the court to actively remove a health benefit from a patient population. The 
significance of this population is an important factor in determining whether an injunction would 
be disproportionate in terms of public health. There will always be someone who is affected, 
but the threshold should be evaluated on the population level to set a proper balance.  
                                                          
398 Mansnerus 2016 p. 168. Many novel therapies that fall into the category of "advanced therapy medical products" 
are quite expensive. So far they have been available to only a few orphan diseases, so their budget impact has 
remained limited. However, as therapies targeting e.g. cancer emerge, national health systems have to make some 
tough choices. From this kind of setting it might seem really tempting to try and pull down the prices of products 
by limiting exclusivity. Yet, Mansnerus notes that there is no evidence that exclusivity alone would cause high 
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The German Federal Supreme Court has discussed the significance of public interest in its case 
Raltegravir (2017), which concerned grant of a compulsory license for the HIV pharmaceutical 
raltegravir. German courts currently do not have discretion in granting injunctions, so the 
defendants of infringement trials have sometimes sought a compulsory license in the name of 
public interest.402 In Raltegravir, the Court stated that also a relatively small patient population 
can constitute an important enough public interest, if the unavailability of the drug would cause 
a big danger to the patients. There were alternative treatments, but the Court held that switching 
a well-functioning treatment to another poses risks to patients and thus there is a public interest 
in keeping the existing therapy available. The fact that the infringing pharmaceutical had been 
on the market for a long time also played a role.403 The case highlights a flexible and context-
dependent interpretation of public health interests and demonstrates that no national emergency 
is required for health interests to prevail in individual cases. However, earlier case law404 of the 
same court has established that activation of the public interest requires special circumstances 
and this still remains the main rule also according to the Raltegravir judgment. 
The decision whether an injunction is appropriate in terms of public health is ultimately a case-
by-case evaluation. The things that affect it include the size of the affected patient population, 
the patients' geographical distribution,405 the seriousness and irreversibility of their medical 
condition, the urgency of the public health concern, whether there is an alternative treatment 
and how good it is, whether the case is more about availability or affordability, and what options 
the national health system has to relieve the situation.406 These factors must be taken into 
account in addition to the interests of the patentee. Different conclusions can be made from the 
same set of facts depending on how e.g. the amount of affected patients is weighed. Thus, the 
                                                          
402 von Falck 2016 p. 352. 
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evaluation is very subjective and affected by values. Purpose-oriented interpretations are also 
possible.407 
5.4 Securing Stable Business Environment 
5.4.1 Effects on Incentive to Innovate 
In section 5.3 the different factors supporting intervention in the name of public health were 
identified. This section concerns the circumstances of the patentee that could affect the 
justifiability of an injunction. The implications of injunction policy for the stability of business 
environment and legal certainty are also discussed.  
Patents are immensely valuable for pharmaceutical companies and have been described as their 
"crown jewels".408 This expression has been criticized to reflect a misunderstanding on the role 
of patents. According the UN Special Rapporteur, patents are not merely entitlements of the 
company, but they also come with social responsibilities to e.g. exercise the invention. 
Exclusivity is a reward for the valuable function the company has performed for society, but the 
company should also consider the benefits of those in need in its use of the reward.409 This is a 
noble idea, but in practice companies tend to treat patents purely as business assets. As such 
there is nothing wrong with this, but it also creates need for additional controls on patent use. 
Above the scope of the right to exclude has been discussed extensively. In general, the scope of 
patent protection is a key factor in determining the value of patents and R&D efforts. If the 
scope of patent protection were made significantly smaller, the effects might cumulate with 
other current problems and produce harmful outcomes in the society at large. One current and 
worrying phenomenon is that the number of new medicines entering the market has been 
steadily declining.410 This number is an established measure of innovation, although its 
relevance can also be questioned. According to innovative pharmaceutical companies, reasons 
for the decline include more complex R&D processes, pharmaceutical price regulation and lack 
of reward for incremental innovation.411 Weakening the position of innovators in terms of 
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existing, profitable products could significantly undermine the prerequisites for future 
innovation.412 
At the same time there are numerous voices that would like to speed up generic products' market 
entry.413 According to these views, innovative pharmaceutical companies already have various 
means to ensure exclusivity, including the regulatory market exclusivities (data and market 
exclusivity and exclusivities under the orphan drugs and pediatric regulations).414 In this 
toolbox, the exclusivity resulting from a patent might not even be the most important.415 Rather 
the companies' various "life cycle management" or "evergreening" strategies can compromise 
public interests by delaying market entry of generic products even after the original exclusivity 
periods are over.416 
On the other hand, market entry of generics has already been made easier in many countries. 
One means for this has been the possibility to use the originator's data as a reference in the 
approval of a generic version and the implementation of the Bolar exemption.417 As a result of 
these policies, virtually all patented medicines receive a generic competitor when the exclusivity 
expires.418 This used to not be the case, so at least some of these policies must have been efficient 
in facilitating competition and better patient access. It should also be remembered that generic 
companies are also in pursuit of profit. Charity is not their core purpose, so sometimes their 
conduct can evoke equal criticism as that of innovative companies.419 
A frequent concern on behalf of the patentees is how they would be incentivized to innovate if 
there would be no guarantee of exclusivity for the patent term. Excessive use of public interest 
arguments is seen as a waste of time and resources and the more courts lean on those arguments 
the likelier it is that the cost-benefit balance of the patent system will be distorted.420 These 
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views emphasize the careful balance of the pharmaceutical incentive system as a whole and the 
net social benefits gained from active pharmaceutical development.421 This is an important 
notion that is sometimes left in the shadow in typical debates: powerful incentives also support 
patient interests and health rights indirectly through contributing to better treatments in the 
future. Exclusivity remains an important incentive that cannot be replaced in an instant.  
There are also opposite views. According to Ayres and Klemperer,422 it would be just as 
incentivizing in economic terms as the current situation if there would be no absolute 
exclusivity, but the duration of the "right to get paid" would be longer. This might even be 
beneficial for society, because the patentee would and could not charge monopoly prices for the 
limited patent term.423 This might help solve some access issues for pharmaceuticals, because 
more people could potentially afford novel medicines sooner. The role of injunctions in creating 
the incentive to innovate is sometimes taken for granted. It can also be argued that the money 
received in the form of license royalties or compensation for infringement is a great enough 
incentive for future inventions.424 This is an especially convincing argument in the case of non-
practicing entities, but it cannot be downright rejected for pharmaceutical patents either.  
It seems that although current business strategies lean heavily on exclusivity, it might not be as 
fundamental a feature as the companies would like to convince to the public. Introducing more 
characteristics of the liability rule to pharmaceutical patent enforcement would not necessarily 
mean that an entire industry becomes unprofitable. The strategies of pharmaceutical companies 
and the counter-initiatives to eradicate undesired practices highlight that the pharmaceutical 
industry is used to developing new tactics and to balance between fair and questionable 
competition. Obviously, it would be detrimental if injunctions suddenly became very hard to get 
without any additional guarantees to the pharmaceutical companies. However, the guidelines 
suggested in this analysis would largely maintain the current right to exclude and reserve 
interference for special circumstances. In all cases, appropriate compensation would be 
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guaranteed. Of course, different interpretations of the same guidelines can occur, so there could 
be rather a lot of legal uncertainty despite the initial intentions.425 
5.4.2 Avoiding Denial of Injunction 
The discretionary approach to injunctions undoubtedly increases legal uncertainty. There might 
still be measures that the patentee could take to increase the chances that their interest to exclude 
is considered a priority. Even if no direct obligations to promote human rights exist, a patentee 
could take into account health rights with the result that there are no compelling public health 
interests standing in the way of granting an injunction. 
Some pharmaceutical companies have introduced their own health rights programs, which might 
be interpreted in their favor. Despite adopting such programs, the companies tend to oppose 
arguments that imply that they would be legally obligated to do so. They admit that health rights 
are an important concern, but find it hard to imagine how their enforcement could operate in 
practice.426 Companies undoubtedly view ethics-involvement as an important brand 
management tool, because so many innovative pharmaceutical companies are part of industry 
organizations that set ethical guidelines with rather strict obligations and enforcement 
mechanisms.427 However, they evidently prefer these voluntary tools over legal obligations that 
would interfere with their profit-making. 
One starting point for evaluating the "ethics" of the company could be looking at whether they 
are part of industry organizations and committed to following some ethical guidelines. However, 
these guidelines are typically more about ethical marketing of pharmaceuticals than public 
health aspects. What could also work in the favor of the patentee would be if it could show that 
it has carefully mapped the public health status of the indications of the pharmaceutical in 
question.428 It could then be able to show that it has taken some measures or adopted strategies 
to improve the situation in areas of medical need. If the patentee is taking reasonable steps to 
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ensure realization of health rights, there would most likely be no need for additional measures 
in the form of limiting exclusivity.429 
Thus, it seems likely that the patentee could also affect the likelihood of an injunction being 
denied. This would be in addition to the public health concerns that are independent of the 
patentee's conduct. If the situation at hand were a borderline case, the measures taken by the 
patentee could be the decisive factor. It seems that this kind of pressure might push company 
strategies into a more human rights friendly direction and indirectly create a form of human 
rights obligations for pharmaceutical companies. In any case, the patentee would also be 
equipped to affect the availability of injunctions for itself. With this aspect in mind, it does not 
seem that the business environment of pharmaceuticals would become too unstable or 
unpredictable with the described interpretation. 
5.5 What Will We Value in the Future? 
5.5.1 Values behind Different Injunction Policies 
This section will discuss the values related to the different approaches that have arisen in the 
above analysis. The goal of this section is also to find out what the role of health rights is or 
should be in patent law. There is no legal dogmatic answer to the question whether health rights 
should have a bigger role and whether they should be used as an active limitation to 
pharmaceutical patent enforcement. These questions are inherently about values and answering 
those means that we as a community must decide how much value we want to give to these 
interests in relation to one another.  
Some form of primacy seems to exist for health rights, but it is quite invisible in routine cases. 
Yet, even when the interests of the patentee are duly noted, it is held important that patent 
enforcement does not form a significant barrier to access to medicine.430 It would seem that at 
least many human rights scholars would like patent enforcement to be subordinate to health 
rights whenever reasonable. This reflects valuing human rights above property and trade-related 
rights. 
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Another question is when exactly it is reasonable to limit patent enforcement. The eBay 
approach of the USA has been praised for its flexibility and ability to take into account a 
multitude of different circumstances.431 Some are happy about the possibility to prevent hold-
up, which results in disproportionate rewards for the patentee.432 Some have promoted a similar 
approach also in Europe. Yet, discretion inevitably increases legal uncertainty. For this reason 
some favor a less discretionary approach, which would mean a strong right to exclude.433 It has 
also been argued that a strong property rule (right to exclude) should be favored, because it 
permits patentees to price their unique inventions properly.434 This can in turn increase 
efficiency of the market by decreasing the amount of litigation, because settlements are 
generally favored when parties agree on what the outcome of a court decision would be.435 On 
the other hand, some are of the opinion that a court is more competent to set a rough value for a 
patent than a patentee that possibly abuses their position in a hold-up-like manner.436 The 
dilemma here is about how efficiency of the market, fair pricing and competition are interpreted 
and valued in relation to one another. 
Hold-up is generally not an issue in the pharmaceutical sector, because pharmaceutical products 
typically only consist of a single or a few patented inventions and the patents are owned by the 
manufacturer.437 At the time of the eBay decision, pharmaceutical companies were afraid that 
the decision would hinder them from enforcing their rights. This would have been a problem, 
because a single pharmaceutical patent can be immensely valuable. Such a phenomenon does 
not exist e.g. in the software industry, where one product can utilize hundreds of patents.438 In 
such a setting it is technically possible that the manufacturer was not aware of all the patents it 
needed to get a license for. It seems rather ridiculous that a pharmaceutical company that has 
made the investments necessary to produce a drug would not have checked whether the molecule 
is patented.439 Thus, the assumption is that virtually all pharmaceutical patent infringements are 
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willful. This might be relevant when considering injunctions from the perspective of fairness. 
Punishing the infringer could be held an argument in favor of injunctions. This kind of punitive 
mindset might lead to a conclusion that injunctions are needed to constrain infringement. 
Now it is clear that eBay did not actually have a big effect on the enforcement of pharmaceutical 
patents, because their owners are generally not prone to be involved in hold-up-like situations.440 
Yet, there have been several accusations of opportunistic behavior of innovative pharma in their 
attempts to keep out generic competition.441 It has been suggested that these strategies are the 
reason why pharmaceutical companies have opposed growing discretion of courts in granting 
injunctions.442 Another reason is the careful balance of the company's R&D investments and the 
profits made by a product – this balance being only known to the originator company. It is likely 
that the license royalties awarded by a court would be less than what the company would get by 
selling the product exclusively. This would not match the expectations of the company and thus 
would produce a burden for the business.443 These perspectives highlight corporate 
responsibility and punishing the patentee for socially unacceptable conduct. The counter-
arguments prioritize protection of legitimate business strategies and viable companies from 
external concerns. The notion of health rights as an external concern to the patentee intersects 
with a wider discussion of IP and external effects. The last section will be dedicated to 
discussing the role of health rights in patent law from this perspective. 
5.5.2 Human Rights as External Effects 
A trend of the past two decades has been the discussion of external effects in the context of 
IP.444 They are costs or benefits that are inflicted on someone else than the decision-maker, in 
this case consequences to the public from the actions of the patentee. The "public interests" 
discussed a lot in this thesis can be perceived as such external effects:445 the patentee's business 
decisions affect health of patients who might or might not have access to a particular 
pharmaceutical because of them. Some have noted that the public interest is increasingly 
identifiable as interests of a particular group – here the patients – so the anonymous protection 
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of public interest might be unnecessary.446 However, the health of people can have a multitude 
of effects on the society, from healthcare costs to employment and economy. Therefore it seems 
simplistic to reduce public health considerations to interests of patients in their own health. 
Rather, it seems that health is truly a public interest that has effects in all areas of society. 
The general consensus seems to be that interests of a patent owner need to be balanced with 
public interests.447 This makes IP not an absolute but a rebuttable entitlement.448 The appropriate 
balance cannot always be incorporated into patent laws as a general rule, but sometimes it must 
be struck by competition law or through private negotiations.449 Traditionally, the 
"internalization" of public interest concerns into IP laws has been favored instead of employing 
external tools such as competition law.450 The approaches identified in this thesis are in essence 
tools that could be employed to internalize health rights considerations to patent law so that a 
pharmaceutical patent owner would have to take them into account in their business decisions. 
Human rights, including health, currently appear as external to pharmaceutical companies, 
because they are not directly in the interests of the company. They certainly are external, if they 
are only employed in extreme court cases to find a balance that would not be supported by 
conventional patent law. The eBay test has internalized public health considerations into US 
patent law by making the fulfilment of a public interest criterion a prerequisite for injunctive 
relief. A rise of the proportionality approach and health rights might do the same in the EU with 
the conditions discussed above. Such internalization could diminish the sense of unfairness that 
occurs when external tools are brought to constrain "legitimate" patent strategies. 
To conclude this chapter, public health is currently an external concern for European 
pharmaceutical patents. From this perspective it is understandable that some companies and 
scholars promote "shielding" patents from such concerns. Internalization of public health 
concerns would create more room for actual interest balancing. Such internalization could be 
done by adopting a discretionary approach to injunctions so that evaluation of public interests 
would be part of the infringement trial. From this setting it would then be possible to make 
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arguments about where the balance should be and in which cases public health would prevail 
over exclusivity. As long as there is no approved way of bringing health rights arguments to 
patent enforcement discussions, those interests are more likely to be neglected and any 
balancing done by courts is bound to be random. 
6.  Conclusion 
The discussion concerning discretion in granting injunctions has often been framed as a debate 
between those who defend a strong right to exclude and those who wish to abolish it. From this 
perspective the central question seems to be whether one is pro or contra injunctions – whether 
they should be issued or not; whether they should maintain their fundamental position in patent 
law or not. There is also another way to frame the issue. This point of view is not about 
promoting or opposing the use of injunctions as such. Rather, it is about how we should use 
them.  
The fundamental role of injunctions should be utilized to develop patent law and pharmaceutical 
business to a desired direction. Of course, not even experts are unanimous about what the desired 
direction is. What this approach highlights is that injunctions should not be treated as a 
fundamental right but instead as a tool to reach certain aims and promote certain values. If this 
is what they are for, then they should obviously be discretionary. This notion itself is not a threat 
to pharmaceutical business or a guarantee to realization of health rights. In practice it only means 
that it is possible for a court to strike a fair balance in each individual case. The alternative 
would be that the solution of the legislator is applied blindly to all circumstances. If an extreme 
situation then arose, the court would have to resort to arguments external to patent law, for 
example the constitutional law argument that health enjoys primacy over property. This would 
be likely to lead to surprising decisions, which is usually not in anyone's interest.451  
Simply allowing discretion to be exercised in the grant of injunctions does not guarantee that a 
fair balance is found. In this thesis, I have identified factors that should play a part in setting the 
balance. These include the amount of affected patients and the seriousness of their condition, 
the relationship of availability and affordability, equivalence of alternatives, actions the patentee 
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has taken to facilitate patient access, reliance of the patentee's business on exclusivity and the 
effects on the patentee's future R&D investments. There are many ways in which these and other 
factors can be weighed and balanced against one another in theory and in individual cases. 
Ultimately the decisions must be made case-by-case, but it would be recommendable that the 
theoretical balance is set so that it allows for both rights to win under some circumstances. 
The main research question in this thesis was whether this kind of discretion to balance different 
interests exists in European patent law for pharmaceutical patents. Currently hardly any 
discretion exists in practice. However, the ambiguity of relevant patent law provisions and the 
increasing importance and direct application of human rights law provide a chance to introduce 
such discretion. Because of the diversity of European courts dealing with patent matters there 
are many forums where this kind of discretion could be adopted. The most powerful would be 
the CJEU that could introduce a binding interpretation of the Enforcement Directive. The UPC 
could adopt discretion only into its own practice just like national courts. However, all of these 
would be likely to affect one another despite lack of legal strength. 
Discretion, in the meaning of balancing, would in my opinion fit well into European patent law 
and more broadly European IP law, which is constantly becoming more aware of human rights 
interests that should be weighed properly – sometimes at the cost of exclusive rights. The notion 
of property as a fundamental right has limited practical applications, because use of property is 
perhaps one of the simplest human rights to limit. Allowing public interest arguments an official 
role in the enforcement of pharmaceutical patents would not necessarily mean undermining 
pharmaceutical business. Everything depends on where the balance is struck. Interests of the 
patentee can be highly esteemed even if other interests are recognized as valid. In standard cases 
the outcomes would most likely remain the same, because there is a lot of respect for property 
rights. How much emphasis is put on health rights is a question of how much legal uncertainty 
we are willing to endure in order to ensure that they can be taken into account under appropriate 
circumstances. 
Further research and future developments will show how these perspectives relate to the 
increasing use of personalized treatments and biosimilars and the blurring of the traditional 
division to innovators and generic manufacturers. What is also left open here is whether the 
current forms of protection for pharmaceutical innovation are the most appropriate ones and 
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what kind of reforms might be made to better reward and incentivize innovation. I also have not 
addressed the question of what would be the most appropriate way of balancing patent rights 
and health rights: would it be discretionary injunctions or rather compulsory licenses, 
competition law or legislative reforms? Additionally, the national systems that must make 
decisions about balancing resources with patient needs are very relevant for the big picture. The 
decisions and policies of authorities have huge effects on future prospects in the highly regulated 
pharmaceutical business. The possibilities and needs for legislative reforms or changes in public 
policy would be a subject for another study.  
